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Hurst v. Florida’s Ha’p’orth of Tar: The 
Need to Revisit Caldwell, Clemons, and 
Proffitt 
CRAIG TROCINO* AND CHANCE MEYER 
   In Hurst v. Florida, the Supreme Court held Florida’s 
death penalty scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because 
judges, rather than juries, found sentencing facts necessary 
to impose death. That Sixth Amendment ruling has implica-
tions for Florida’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
    Under the Eighth Amendment rule of Caldwell v. Missis-
sippi, capital juries must appreciate their responsibility for 
death sentencing. Yet, Florida has instructed juries that their 
fact-findings merely support sentencing recommendations, 
while leaving the ultimate sentencing decision to a judge. 
Because Hurst clarifies that the Sixth Amendment requires 
juries to find the operative set of facts on which sentences 
are actually determined, Florida must revisit whether its 
capital juries have felt the full weight of their proper consti-
tutional role. 
   Under the Eighth Amendment rule of Clemons v. Missis-
sippi, appellate courts may reweigh sentencing facts and 
conduct harmless error analyses after finding an invalid ag-
gravating factor was used at sentencing. Florida has permit-
ted Clemons review on judge-found facts. After Hurst, Flor-
ida must revisit whether such review required sentencing 
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facts found by juries. 
   Florida’s pre-Hurst death penalty scheme was held to sat-
isfy the Eighth Amendment in Proffitt v. Florida. That hold-
ing relied on the involvement of juries in finding sentencing 
facts and automatic review by the Florida Supreme Court. 
Hurst makes clear that Florida juries had no involvement in 
finding sentencing facts, and appellate review was based on 
facts improperly found by judges. Hurst, therefore, requires 
that Florida revisit Proffitt.  
   Repairs to Florida’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
should be made in the immediate aftermath of Hurst, while 
the finality of pre-Hurst death sentences already must be dis-
turbed to satisfy the Sixth. In other words, Florida can repair 
today at little expense Eighth Amendment problems that may 
prove catastrophic tomorrow. And Florida, full as it is of 
able sailors, should know not to spoil the ship for a halfpen-
nyworth of tar. 
 
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................1119 
I.   REVISITING CALDWELL V. MISSISSIPPI: THE TROUBLE WITH 
TELLING CAPITAL JURIES THEIR FACTFINDINGS DON’T 
MATTER ...............................................................................1132 
II.   REVISITING CLEMONS V. MISSISSIPPI: APPELLATE COURTS 
CAN’T REVIEW FACTFINDINGS THAT DON’T EXIST .............1143 
1.  APPELLATE REWEIGHING OF SENTENCING FACTORS 
AFTER HURST .............................................................1148 
2.  HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS AFTER HURST ...............1152 
3.  Secondhand sentencing after Hurst ..........................1161 
III.  REVISITING PROFFITT V. FLORIDA: THE ARBITRARINESS OF 





Florida knows how to weather a storm. And so too does Flor-
ida’s death penalty. In the summer of 1972, the United States Su-
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preme Court struck down capital sentencing regimes across the na-
tion because they violated the Eighth Amendment by “so wan-
tonly and so freakishly” failing to “respect human dignity.”1 Before 
the year was out, Florida called a special legislative session and 
became the first state to adopt a new death penalty statute.2 
When the time came for the first execution under the new 
statute, prison officials were worried that Old Sparky3 might not 
work properly.4 The electric chair had not been used in fifteen 
years, and there was no execution protocol to follow.5 So they 
resolved to give John Arthur Spenkelink6 two shots of whiskey7 
                                                                                                             
 1 In Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court found that the 
manner in which states were imposing the death penalty was cruel and unusual, 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). As 
Justice Stewart put it, the Eighth Amendment could not tolerate death to be “so 
wantonly and so freakishly imposed.” See id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
Justice Brennan’s central concern was that “the State does not respect human 
dignity.” See id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 2 See MICHAEL MELLO, DEATHWORK: DEFENDING THE CONDEMNED 33 
(2002) (“Only five months after the Furman decision, the Florida Legislature met 
in special session to consider a new capital punishment statute.”); State v. Dixon, 
283 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1973) (noting Florida Statute § 921.141 became effective 
December 8, 1972). 
 3 “Florida’s electric chair was . . . nicknamed ‘Old Sparky.’” Jones v. State, 
701 So. 2d 76, 82 (Fla. 1997) (Shaw, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Shaw 
stated, “[L]egend has it that the chair . . . was a home-made affair, fashioned by 
inmates on-site from a single oak tree.” Id. (Shaw, J., dissenting) (footnotes omit-
ted). 
 4 David Brierton, superintendent of Florida State Prison at the time of John 
Arthur Spenkelink’s execution and later the Secretary of the Florida Department 
of Corrections, “had two fears - the chair wouldn’t work or the governor would 
call five minutes after it was over and say there was a stay.” Associated Press, 
Execution to Mark Death Penalty Anniversary, GAINESVILLE SUN, (May 23, 
2004, 6:01 AM) http://www.gainesville.com/arti-
cle/20040523/LOCAL/205230307. 
 5 “Florida did not have an executioner. It had not used the electric chair in 
15 years. It had no written procedures on how to conduct an execution.” Id. 
 6 “The first to die when executions resumed in Florida was John Spen-
kelink. . .” Sydney P. Freedberg, The Story of Old Sparky, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES 
(Sept. 25, 1999), 
http://www.sptimes.com/92599/news_pf/State/The_story_of_Old_Spar.shtml. 
 7 “On a spring morning .  .  .  John Spenkelink had two swigs of Jack 
Daniels whiskey before being executed in Florida’s electric chair. The whiskey 
was a sedative and ‘last meal’ for Spenkelink, 30.” Zaimarie De Guzman, 
David Gore’s Execution Will Reflect Modern Changes in Florida’s Death Row 
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before strapping him in—small mercies.8 Spenkelink lived through 
the first two surges of 2,250 volts before the third finally killed 
him.9 And it was thus that—to the sound of frying bacon, broadcast 
by a Jacksonville radio station near death row to celebrate the return 
of the Chair10—Florida’s capital justice system got back underway. 
The days of wanton disrespect for human dignity were past. 
Another tempestuous time came in the 1990s, when Florida’s 
electric chair protocol caused a series of horrifically botched exe-
cutions. Witnesses looked on as flames, sparks, and, in one in-
stance, blood erupted from the heads of Jesse Tafero, Pedro Me-
dina, and Allen Lee Davis.11 The repeated spectacles might have 
been enough for the public to lose its taste for capital punishment 
entirely,12 or a court to hold the electric chair unconstitutionally 
                                                                                                             
Since its Inception, TCPALM (April 11, 2012), http://www.tcpalm.com/news/da-
vid-gores-execution-will-reflect-modern-changes-in-floridas-death-row- since-
its-inception-ep-38278-343311752.html. 
 8 Id. (“Spenkelink was seated and strapped into the three-legged electric 
oak chair, known as ‘Old Sparky. . . . His head was shaved and covered in elec-
trically- conductive gel, his mouth covered by a black gag.”). 
 9 See Freedberg, supra note 6 (“It took three jolts to kill him.”); see also De 
Guzman, supra note 7 (“Three surges of 2,250-volt shocks killed him.”). 
 10 “The day Spenkelink was put to death, a popular Jacksonville disc jockey 
aired a recording of sizzling bacon and dedicated it to the doomed killer.” 
STEPHEN G. MICHAUD & HUGH AYNESWORTH, THE ONLY LIVING WITNESS: 
THE TRUE STORY OF SERIAL SEX KILLER TED BUNDY (1999). 
 11 “[S]moke and flames [shot] from [the] head” of Jesse Tafero in 1990. 
Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 339 (Fla. 2007). “[A] former maker 
of electric chairs said the chair’s aging electrodes caused Tafero to be burned 
alive.” Freedberg, supra note 6. “[F]lames and smoke again erupted” near the 
head of Pedro Medina in 1997. Lightbourne, 969 So. 2d at 340. “During Davis’ 
execution on July 8, some witnesses gasped as blood flowed from under his death 
mask and soaked his white shirt.” Freedberg, supra note 6. 
 12 “If executions get gross, the public, otherwise solidly for them, might 
begin to get turned off. Even ashamed of them.” Mary Jo Melone, A Switch is 
Thrown, and God Speaks, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (July 13, 1999) 
http://www.sptimes.com/News/71399/news_pf/TampaBay/A_switch_is-thrown. 
Two public polls conducted in 1997 suggested that “Floridians were ready to ban-
ish Old Sparky.” Freedberg, supra note 6. However, there was also plenty of ev-
idence to suggest Florida’s appetite for “its time-honored death rituals” was 
endless. Id. It had always been a huge plus politically. “During his campaign for 
governor in 1986, for example, Tampa Mayor Bob Martinez vowed that if he was 
elected, ‘Florida’s electric bill [would] go up.’” Id. And, even after the gruesome 
botch of Medina’s execution, Florida Attorney General Bob Butterworth saw 
Florida’s horror-show executions as a matter to be publically bragged about, not 
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cruel and unusual.13 But neither happened. The Florida Legislature 
called another special session and adopted a lethal injection proto-
col.14 With Old Sparky retired, constitutional challenges were 
mooted.15 And so Florida’s death penalty endured once again, 
bowed yet not broken. 
But the Sunshine State is never long without a storm. 
In 2015, the United States Supreme Court accepted certiorari 
in Hurst v. Florida to consider whether Florida’s death penalty 
scheme—still roughly the same scheme that Florida hastily re-
                                                                                                             
humbled by, commenting that “[p]eople who wish to commit murder, they’d bet-
ter not do it in the state of Florida because we may have a problem with the electric 
chair.” Associated Press, Condemned Man’s Mask Bursts Into Flame During Ex-
ecution, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 1997), http://www.ny-
times.com/1997/03/26/us/condemned-man-s-mask-bursts-into-flame-during-ex-
ecution.html. And he was right to believe that support continued. After Medina, 
the Legislature voted 36-0 in the Senate and 103-6 in the House to retain the 
Chair. Freedberg, supra note 6. The following year, State Senator Ginny 
Brown-Waite, who volunteered to watch the Davis execution, said the stain 
formed the shape of a cross, which she considered to be a message from God, 
indicating that he gave his blessing to Florida’s use of Old Sparky. See Melone, 
supra note 12. 
 13 The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Chair on 
several occasions. Justice Shaw of the Florida Supreme Court, joined by Chief 
Justice Kogan and Justice Anstead, concluded that “[b]ecause of the spate of 
malfunctions in this jerry-built and now-dated chair, I find that execution by 
electrocution as currently practiced in this state no longer serves a humane 
purpose and in fact violates the prohibition against ‘cruel or unusual’ punish-
ment contained in the Florida Constitution.” Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76, 
82–83 (Fla. 1997) (Shaw, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). But the court ulti-
mately held 4-7 that “Florida’s electric chair is not cruel or unusual punishment,” 
partly based on the inexplicable reasoning that “[t]he record also contains evi-
dence that the electric chair is and has been functioning properly and that the 
electrical circuitry is being maintained.” Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 
415 (Fla. 1999). Justice Shaw took the extraordinary step of inserting color pho-
tographs of Davis sitting blood-soaked in the Chair after the execution, with a 
purple contorted face. Id. at 444. But the United States Supreme Court, for the 
first time, granted certiorari to determine whether the electric chair was uncon-
stitutional. Deborah W. Denno, Adieu to Electrocution, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
665, 665 (2000). 
 14 “In 2000, the Florida Legislature provided for a new method of exe-
cution: lethal injection.” Lightbourne, 969 So. 2d at 341. 
 15 “The Court ultimately dismissed its certiorari grant in light of the Florida 
legislature’s decision to switch to lethal injection.” Denno, supra note 13 at 665. 
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fashioned in 1972 in an attempt to comply with the Eighth Amend-
ment—violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing judges, rather 
than juries, to make the critical factual findings which render a 
defendant eligible for the death penalty.16 The State, seeing dark 
clouds forming on the horizon, made ready to once again head for 
the shelter of anti-retroactivity law,17 harmless error law,18 and other 
procedural safe harbors19 which, in the past, had protected Florida’s 
death penalty from being swept away in the winds of changing law 
and policy. 
But when the decision in Hurst made landfall on January 12, 
2016, it seemed, at first glance, more in the way of a passing 
gale than a hurricanic constitutional event. Despite the Roberts 
Court’s notorious loquaciousness20—the opinions of its 2009 term 
                                                                                                             
 16 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida at i, 
Hurst v. Florida, Case No. 14-7505 (Dec. 3, 2014). While Eighth Amendment 
implications were part of the issue presented in Hurst and were on the table for 
the Court’s consideration, the Court did not expressly address the Eighth Amend-
ment in its ruling. 
 17 Florida’s retroactivity standard was established in Witt v. State, which lim-
its the retroactive effect of new constitutional rules only to significant “jurispru-
dential upheavals.” 387 So. 2d 922, 929 (Fla. 1980). For instance, when Cald-
well v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985), announced Eighth Amendment re-
quirements for preserving juries’ appreciation for the gravity of their role in cap-
ital sentencing, the Florida Supreme Court found “Caldwell did not represent a 
change in the law upon which to justify a collateral attack,” Foster v. State, 518 
So. 2d 901, 901 (Fla. 1987), so defendants whose cases were already final could 
not get the benefit of Caldwell. 
 18 Even where multiple constitutional infirmities are found in Florida cases, 
the Florida Supreme Court will affirm where it concludes the errors are harm-
less. See Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1166 (Fla. 2014) (“The 
cumulative effect of multiple harmless errors does not amount to fundamental er-
ror . . . .”). 
 19 There are procedural hurdles to relief in addition to anti-retroactivity and 
harmless error analysis. For instance, in federal courts, unconstitutional state 
death sentences cannot be overturned if the rule making them unconstitutional 
was not “clearly established federal law” at the time the Florida Supreme Court 
affirmed them. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “The phrase ‘clearly established federal law’ 
refers only to ‘the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s 
decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.’” Bates v. Sec’y, 
Florida Dep’t of Corrs., 768 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Williams 
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)) (alteration in original). 
 20 Regarding the opinions of the Roberts Court, “[s]ome critics say today’s 
lengthy opinions aren’t necessarily models of clarity.” Debra Cassens Weiss, 
U.S. Supreme Court Sets Record for Longest Opinions Ever, ABA 
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setting a record high median word count at 4,75121—the opinion in 
Hurst was a little wee. Hurst breezed in at approximately a light 
2,882 words.22 Where was the grand exposition of a Furman v. 
Georgia, which reached back into antiquity to examine the English 
“progenitors” of American constitutional rules?23 Where was the 
guidance and instruction of a Gregg v. Georgia, which described for 
states trying to comply with Furman the structure and methodology 
of a bifurcated sentencing proceeding that would do so.24 For that 
matter, where was the poetry, like Justice Blackmun’s world-
weary lament in Callins v. Collins that after each round of freshest 
death penalty atrocities “[t]he wheels of justice will churn again”?25 
These usual storm conditions were missing. 
But, light on reasoning though it might have been, the opin-
ion’s holding was a sharp crack of thunder. After briefly describing 
Florida’s death penalty scheme, the Court wrote pointedly, and 
without qualification, “We hold this sentencing scheme unconsti-
tutional.”26 The reasoning in support of that holding was little more 
than a basic syllogism: “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, 
not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of 
                                                                                                             
J. (Nov. 19, 2010, 11:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/u.s._su
preme_court_sets_record_for_longest_opinions_ever. 
 21 Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rul-
ings.html?_r=0 (“The Roberts court set a record last term, issuing majority opin-
ions with a median length of 4,751 words, according to data collected by two 
political scientists, James F. Spriggs II of Washington University in St. Louis 
and Ryan C. Black of Michigan State.”) 
 22 Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016). 
 23 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 317 (1972). 
 24 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). 
 25 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Sotomayor’s restraint might have had to do with the far-reaching 
effects the decision would have. In Furman, Justice Marshall had recognized the 
need to be “precise” and “exacting” in drafting a decision “free from any 
possibility of error,” where a case involves not only the life of the petitioner but 
also “other condemned men and women in this country currently awaiting exe-
cution.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 26 Hurst, slip op. at 1. 
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death,”27 Florida let judges do that,28 so Florida’s death penalty 
scheme was unconstitutional.29 
It became clear in the weeks after Hurst that Justice Sotomayor’s 
succinctness in drafting the opinion would do nothing to limit its 
impact. The winds began to pick up. The Florida Supreme Court 
asked for supplemental briefing to address Hurst in a great many 
capital cases.30 Amici flocked to the lead case of Lambrix v. State, 
in which Mr. Lambrix faced a death warrant setting his execution 
                                                                                                             
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. “Florida law required the judge to hold a separate hearing and determine 
whether sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to justify imposing the 
death penalty” after the jury had recommended a sentence of death based on its 
own determination as to aggravating circumstances. Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See, e.g., Lowe v. State, No. SC12-263 (Fla. Jan. 14, 2016) (order granting 
appellant’s “Motion for Supplemental Briefing in Light of the Decision in Hurst 
v. Florida”); Knight v. State, No. SC14-1775 (Fla. Jan. 19, 2016) (order directing 
parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Hurst v. State, No. 14-7505, 2016 
WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016)); State v. Bright, No. SC14-1701 (Fla. Jan. 19, 
2016) (order directing parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Hurst v. State, 
No. 14-7505 2016 WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016)); State v. Dougan, No. SC13-
1826 (Fla. Jan. 19, 2016) (order directing parties to file supplemental briefs ad-
dressing Hurst v. State, No. 14-7505, 2016 WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016)); 
Johnson v. State, No. SC14-1175 (Fla. Jan. 29, 2016) (order granting appellant’s 
motion requesting to file a supplemental brief addressing Hurst v. State, No. 14-
7505, 2016 WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016)); King v. State, No. SC14-1949 (Fla. 
Jan. 19, 2016) (order directing parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Hurst 
v. State, No. 14-7505, 2016 WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016)); Morris v. State, 
No. SC14-1317 (Fla. filed Jan 19, 2016) (order granting appellant’s motion re-
questing to file a supplemental brief addressing Hurst v. State, No. 14-7505, 2016 
WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016)); Simmons v. State, No. SC14-2314 (Fla. filed 
Jan. 19, 2016) (order granting appellant’s motion requesting to file a supplemental 
brief addressing Hurst v. State, No. 14-7505, 2016 WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 
2016)); Wright v. State, No. SC13-1213 (Fla. filed Jan. 29, 2016) (order directing 
parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Hurst v. State, No. 14-7505 2016 
WL 112683 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016)); Jackson v. State, No. SC13-1232 (Fla. filed 
Jan. 29, 2016); Mullens v. State, No. SC13-1824 (Fla. filed Feb. 1, 2016) 
(granting appellant’s “Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief Addressing 
Hurst v. Florida”); Williams v. State, No. SC14-814 (Fla. filed Jan. 29, 2016) 
(granting Appellant’s “Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Briefs in Light of 
Hurst v. Florida”). 
1126 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
for February 11, 2016, and had raised a Hurst claim before the de-
cision had come down.31 Trial proceedings were stayed and contin-
ued, one trial judge stating that “[w]hen human life hangs in the 
balance— a rush to judgment is unwise” and would “result in 
the trivialization of the value of human life.”32 The Florida Leg-
islature got about the business of rebuilding, as committees began 
debating proposed bills to rewrite Florida’s death statute,33 later cul-
minating in the Governor signing a new death penalty scheme into 
law on March 7, 2016.34 Coverage ramped up among the news 
media.35 And Lambrix was given a stay of execution, so the Florida 
                                                                                                             
 31 Cary Michael Lambrix filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Flor-
ida Supreme Court the day before Hurst issued, arguing the court should stay the 
proceedings pending the decision in Hurst. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus at 5, 20, Lambrix v. Jones, Case No. SC16-56 (Fla. filed Jan. 11, 2016). Amici 
included the Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of the Federal Defender for the 
Northern District of Florida. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Lambrix v. Jones, No. 
SC16-56 (Fla filed Jan. 15, 2016); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Am. Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation & Am. Civil Liberties of Fla. in Support of Petitioner Cary 
Michael Lambrix, Lambrix v. Jones, No. SC16-56 (Fla. filed Jan. 21, 2016); Brief 
of Amicus Curiae, Fla. Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers on behalf of Petitioner Lam-
brix, Lambrix v. Jones, No. SC16-56 (Jan. 22, 2016). 
 32 Order Granting State’s Motion to Continue at 3, State v. Toledo, Case No. 
2013 102888 CFDL (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 15, 2016). 
 33 See Steve Bousquet, Dozens of Florida’s Death Row Inmates Expected 
to Challenge Sentences, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 4, 2016, 6:47 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/arti-
cle58519953.html (“The Hurst case is expected to unleash a flood of new ap-
peals and is forcing a conservative, pro-death penalty Legislature to hurriedly 
rewrite the law so that executions can resume.”); Lizette Alvarez, Supreme 
Court Ruling Has Florida Scrambling to Fix Death Penalty Law, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 2, 2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/us/supreme-court-ruling-
has-florida-scrambling-to-fix-death-penalty-law.html?_r=0 (“In the State Capi-
tol, the Republican-controlled Legislature is debating how best to change Flor-
ida’s unorthodox law, with some pushing for a thorough overhaul to blunt 
future legal challenges and others vying for an easy fix that would simply address 
the court’s narrow ruling.”). 
 34 See Bousquet, supra note 33. 
 35 See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Strikes Down Florida’s Death 
Penalty System, NPR (Jan. 12, 2016, 4:25 PM) 
http://www.npr.org/2016/01/12/462821735/supreme-court-strikes-down-floridas-
death-penalty-system; Raoul Cantero & Mark Schlakman, Lawmakers Must Re-
form Florida’s Death Penalty, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 21, 2016, 5:57 PM) 
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-ed-death-penalty-florida-reform-
012216-20160121-story.html; Noreen Marcus, Death Row Case May Reveal Life 
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Supreme Court could consider Hurst.36 All that was missing was the 
usual television images of palm trees laid over in heavy winds. 
During the first oral arguments on Hurst in the Florida Su-
preme Court, the defense’s position boiled down to a simple point: 
“‘To execute people in Florida on the basis of a statute that has 
been declared unconstitutional is just wrong.’”37 The State believed 
that even if it was unfair for future defendants to get the benefit of 
Hurst while others, like Mr. Lambrix, were executed under the un-
constitutional statute, “[f]inality sometimes has to trump fairness.”38 
The justices’ candid comments reflected a sense for Hurst’s mag-
nitude. Justice Lewis said of the court’s prior treatment of the 
Hurst issue, “[w]e can be wrong” and “[w]e have to be big 
enough to admit it.”39 Justice Pariente was also outspoken, stating 
that “[w]e’ve got substantial inequality in Florida” and characteriz-
ing Florida’s death penalty as “an outlier, which is a significant 
problem.”40 
                                                                                                             
After Hurst, DAILY BUS. REV. (February 2, 2016) http://www.dailybusinessre-
view.com/id=1202748481563/Death-Row-Case-May-Reveal-Life-After-
Hurst#ixzz40GFi2E8f (“And conservative legislators must be seeking divine in-
tervention to write a death penalty statute that’s legal yet keeps the execution ma-
chinery going.”). 
 36 See Order Granting Stay, Lambrix v. Jones, Case No. SC16-56 (Fla. filed 
Feb. 2, 2016). 
 37 Steve Bousquet, Florida Supreme Court Blocks Execution of Death Row 
Inmate Michael Lambrix, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016, 4:15 PM) 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/florida-supreme-court-
considers-stay- for-death-row-inmate-cary-michael/2263646 [hereinafter Florida 
Supreme Court Blocks Execution] (quoting defense attorney Martin McClain). 
 38 See Bousquet, supra note 33 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Carol 
Dittmar). 
As to the fact that Florida is an outlier state in allowing judges to override jury 
recommendations for life sentences, Florida’s Solicitor General argued that 
judges “do not contravene the jury’s recommendations very often.” S.M., Su-
preme Skepticism About Florida’s Death Penalty, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 14, 
2015). http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2015/10/execu-
tions-sunshine-state. In other words, this aberrational feature of Florida’s death 
penalty was not a real concern, because even Florida judges did not care for it 
enough to use it. 
 39 Florida Supreme Court Blocks Execution, supra note 37 (quoting Justice 
Lewis). 
 40 Rene Stutzman, Execution Delayed by State
Justices, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 3, 2016, 9:51 AM), 
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In the following weeks, this whirlwind of action continued. 
As we write this article, it still does. It is still uncertain how Florida 
will ultimately resolve the many Sixth Amendment questions posed 
by Hurst.41 We write from the heart of that storm, and even after 
it dissipates there will remain the possibility of courts reconsid-
ering or expanding the decisions reached. Nevertheless, we take 
a moment to look past the Sixth, and ahead to the horizon, where 
still another storm front approaches from the Eighth. While Hurst 
is, by its terms, a Sixth Amendment case describing a Sixth 
Amendment error, it has profound implications on the applicability 
in Florida of several Eighth Amendment precedents. 
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 
an Eighth Amendment violation where a jury’s “sense of responsi-
bility for determining the appropriateness of death”42 is diminished 
by the State. Three years later in Combs v. State, the Florida Su-
preme Court found Caldwell did not make Florida’s death penalty 
scheme unconstitutional for instructing jurors that their fact-find-
ings as to sentencing factors only went to support an advisory, non-
binding sentencing recommendation to the court.43 Hurst now in-
structs that Florida failed to appreciate “[a] jury’s mere recommen-
dation is not enough”44 to satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirement 
that juries, not judges, must find “each fact necessary to impose a 
                                                                                                             
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-florida-death-penalty-
arguments-20160202-story.html (quoting Justice Pariente). 
 41 As described by one Florida circuit court, 
Unfortunately, the Hurst opinion left a number of issues undetermined. For ex-
ample, the opinion failed to address any requirements of unanimity of votes in 
the finding of aggravators, standards to be used in making a determination of mit-
igators, and the requirement (or lack thereof) of unanimity of votes in sentencing 
and the finding of aggravators. More importantly, the opinion failed to inculcate 
Florida on the issue of retroactive application of this law. 
. . . [T]here is no mechanism in place now to “death qualify” a jury. So even at 
the earliest of these proceedings, this court (and the lawyers) would be forced 
to extrapolate and speculate on the meanings of Hurst and how it can (or cannot) 
be incorporated into the existing or new statutes. To compound matters, there is 
a strong likelihood now that the Florida Legislature and/or the Florida Supreme 
Court will be weighing in on this matter while this case would be underway. 
Order Granting State’s Motion to Continue at 2–3, State v. Toledo, Case No. 
2013 102888 CFDL (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 15, 2016). 
 42 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985). 
 43 See Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla. 1988). 
 44 Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016). 
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sentence of death.”45 In light of that finding, the Florida Supreme 
Court should reconsider whether under the Eighth Amendment 
Florida juries were misinformed as to the requisite importance of 
their role in capital sentencing proceedings. Florida juries should 
have been made to feel the weight of the huge responsibility that 
would come with their fact-findings serving as the critical and oper-
ative set of facts on which courts would determine life or death. 
Hurst requires that Florida revisit the Caldwell problem. 
In Clemons v. Mississippi, the U.S. Supreme Court found it 
appropriate for an appellate court to reweigh sentencing factors and 
conduct harmless error analyses to cure the trial-level constitutional 
violation of a death sentence having been based on an invalid ag-
gravating circumstance.46 The Court relied on its prior holdings in 
Hildwin v. Florida,47 that “the Sixth Amendment does not require 
that a jury specify the aggravating factors that permit the imposition 
of capital punishment,” and Spaziano v. Florida,48 that “neither the 
Sixth Amendment, nor the Eighth Amendment, nor any other con-
stitutional provision provides a defendant with the right to have a 
jury determine the appropriateness of a capital sentence.”49 Hurst 
explicitly overruled those precedents, stating that “[t]ime and sub-
sequent cases have washed away the logic of Spaziano and 
Hildwin.”50 Given the holding in Hurst that juries must make the 
fact-findings necessary for death to be imposed, Florida must re-
visit whether appellate courts could constitutionally have re-
weighed sentencing factors and engage in harmless error analyses 
based on judge-found facts, without the requisite jury findings. 
In Proffitt v. Florida, the Court considered whether Florida’s 
statute adopted in response to Furman succeeded in curing Flor-
ida’s Eighth Amendment problems.51 The Court’s analysis relied 
heavily on the involvement of juries in finding aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances and the Florida Supreme Court’s auto-
matic review being effectively facilitated by the requirement that 
                                                                                                             
 45 Id. 
 
 46 See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 746 (1990). 
 47 Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989). 
 48 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (2016). 
 49 Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746. 
 50 Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 9. 
 51 See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 244 (1976). 
1130 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
sentencing judges write orders embodying the critical fact-findings 
on which that review would take place.52 Hurst revealed that jury 
findings were irrelevant to Florida sentencing and appellate review, 
because the only findings of record were those of Florida judges. 
Hurst requires that Florida revisit Proffitt under Furman. 
We urge Florida courts to take it upon themselves to address 
these Eighth Amendment issues in the immediate aftermath of 
Hurst. Waiting to see what they might amount to years or decades 
from now will spoil the ship for a ha’p’orth of tar.53 Given the ex-
tensive Sixth Amendment repairs that must be made after Hurst, 
it would cost the State less in the way of additional re-sentencings, 
post-conviction litigation, disturbing the finality of capital cases, 
and judicial resources to patch up around the Eighth today, while 
already about the work of restoration. Florida can and should extend 
its repairs to Caldwell, Clemons, and Proffitt.54 Avoiding difficult 
Eighth Amendment questions and letting violations pile up in case 
after case over the coming years will only result in greater damage 
to the administration of capital cases if and when the United States 
Supreme Court eventually steps in to remedy the situation. Like the 
Hurst of the Sixth seems to have sunk the entire ship, tomorrow’s 
Hurst of the Eighth might do the same. 
We take this lesson from Florida history. After Ring v. Arizona 
held in 2002 that the fact-findings giving rise to death eligibility 
under Arizona’s capital sentencing statute must be found by juries 
rather than judges,55 Florida failed to correct the constitutional 
infirmity in its own death penalty scheme by extrapolating how the 
underlying constitutional rule of Ring would apply in Florida. The 
Florida Supreme Court instead looked at the situation as having 
                                                                                                             
 52 See id. at 251. 
 53 The proverb “don’t spoil the ship for a ha’p’orth of tar” means that one 
should not risk a large failure in order to save a small amount of cost in the short 
term. It takes only a ha’p’orth—that is, a halfpennyworth—of tar to repair a small 
crack in the hull of a ship. But if that minor expense is not undertaken and that 
minor repair made, the problem may worsen, and the entire ship may sink tomor-
row. 
 54 We do not intend to represent that this list of issues exhausts the greater 
implications of Hurst. There are many other questions, such as the possible 
need for jury findings of intellectual disability to allow for death eligibility 
under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), after the ruling in Hurst. Proffit, 
Clemons, and Caldwell are simply the subjects we have chosen for review. 
 55 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 585 (2002). 
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created a “Need for Legislative Action,” and requested that the 
Florida Legislature “revisit the statute to require some unanimity 
in the jury’s recommendations.”56 The Legislature, for its part, de-
clined to act, did not revise the statute, and, in effect, left it to the 
Florida Supreme Court to take responsibility for ensuring the con-
stitutionality of Florida’s death penalty.. During the stalemate, peo-
ple were being sentenced and put to death57. It was not until four-
teen years later that the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in and, in 
Hurst, demanded that Florida do what it had failed to.. 
After Lockett v. Ohio instructed in 1978 that mitigating circum-
stances could not be limited to a statutory list,58 the Florida Supreme 
Court held that, as long as capital defendants had an opportunity to 
present anything in mitigation, Florida juries did not need to be in-
structed that they could consider mitigating circumstances beyond 
those listed.59 Nine years later, the U.S. Supreme Court again had 
to step in to clarify that juries had to be made aware that they 
could consider any mitigating evidence if Lockett’s mandate was to 
mean anything.60 In the meantime, people had been sentenced and 
put to death. 
After Atkins v. Virginia created a categorical prohibition on the 
execution of the intellectually disabled in 2002,61 Florida created a 
legal fiction to define intellectual disability in a way that was more 
exclusive than the clinical reality of the condition.62 This time, 
it took twelve years for the U.S. Supreme Court to step in and re-
                                                                                                             
 56 Steele v. State, 921 So. 2d 538, 548-50 (Fla. 2005). 
 57 From the time that the Florida Supreme Court called for Legislative action 
in the February 2, 2006, revised opinion in State v. Steele, id., to the time that 
Hurst invalidated Florida’s death penalty in 2016, there were 32 executions, ac-
cording to the Florida Department of Corrections. See Execution List: 1976 – pre-
sent, Florida Department of Corrections, 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/execlist.html. 
 58 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). 
 59 See Downs v. Dugger, 514 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 1987); Thompson v. 
Dugger, 515 So. 2d 173, 175 (Fla. 1987). 
 60 See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987). 
 61 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 62 See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007) (finding that under Flor-
ida’s statute, an IQ score over 70 could not establish intellectual disability despite 
a standard error of measurement accepted and applied by the psychological 
community in clinical diagnosis). 
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quire Florida courts to consider the psychological community’s def-
inition of intellectual disability rather than a contradictory statutory 
fiction.63 In the meantime, people were sentenced and put to death.64 
In each of these instances, Florida would have been better off 
making the tough decisions early and keeping decades-worth of 
unconstitutional death sentences from accumulating. The same is 
true now. 
Florida should not relaunch its death penalty after its Sixth 
Amendment restorations, and continue with executions based on 
pre-Hurst capital sentencings, without also having made neces-
sary repairs to its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. When the 
squall around the Sixth calms, Florida will wake to a red morning 
sky and know that the storm is not yet over.65 History teaches that 
will be no time for defiance or daring. As the U.S. Supreme 
Court has wisely cautioned mariners since the Nineteenth Century, 
one should never, in poor weather, “hazard an extraordinary press 
of sail.”66 
I.   REVISITING CALDWELL V. MISSISSIPPI: THE TROUBLE WITH 
TELLING CAPITAL JURIES THEIR FACTFINDINGS DON’T MATTER 
One year shy of a century ago, in July of 1917,67 a Florida 
prosecutor stood before a capital sentencing jury in a sweltering 
Okaloosa County68 courtroom and said the following: “If there is 
any error committed in this case, the Supreme Court, over in the 
capital of our state, is there to correct it, if any error should be 
done.”69 In a sense, the prosecutor was right. The Florida Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 63 See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). 
 64 From the June 20, 2002, decision in Atkins to the May 27, 2014, decision 
in Hall, there were 35 executions. See Execution List: 1976 – present, Florida 
Department of Corrections, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/execlist.html. 
 65 “Red sky in morning, sailor take warning” is an ancient nautical proverb 
for weather forecasting. JOHN ROUSMANIERE, MARK SMITH, ANAPOLIS BOOK OF 
SEAMANSHIP 135 (4th ed. 2014). 
 66 The “Colorado”, 91 U.S. 692, 702 (1875) (emphasis removed). 
 67 See Blackwell v. State, 79 So. 731, 732 (1918) (“on July 2, 1917, the de-
fendants were placed on trial”). 
 68 See id. 
 69 Id. at 735 (quoting prosecutors remarks in closing argument). 
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Court found there was an error, and the Court corrected it.70 But 
in a  greater sense, the prosecutor was badly mistaken. His statement 
was the error.71 
The Florida Supreme Court found in Blackwell v. State that 
“[t]he purpose and effect of this remark was to suggest to the jury 
that they need not be too greatly concerned about the result of their 
deliberation.”72 The Court went so far as to hold that when a jury 
is “told that in some measure they could disregard their own re-
sponsibility,”73 it “can hardly be treated as harmless,” and thus must 
be reversed on appeal no matter how the State might try to explain 
the problem away.74 
Some forty years later in another capital case, Pait v. State, 
the Florida Supreme Court made a similar finding as to the follow-
ing remarks of the prosecutor: 
The State of Florida also provides this defendant 
with the only right of appeal. The People of the 
State have no right to appeal. This is the last time 
the People of this State will try this case in this court. 
Because whatever you do, the People have no right 
of appeal. They are done. This is their day. But he 
may have another day; he has an appeal. So those 
are the rights that the State of Florida gives to him, 
that intangible object.75 
The Florida Supreme Court reversed, stating that while “a trial 
judge should be given an opportunity to correct such highly preju-
dicial although sometimes impulsive remarks of prosecuting offi-
cials,” some remarks too “deeply implant seeds of prejudice or con-
fusion that even in the absence of a timely objection at the trial 
level it becomes the responsibility of this court to point out the 
                                                                                                             
 70 See Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla. 1959) (describing the error in 
Blackwell). 
 71 See id. 
 72 Blackwell, 79 So. at 735–36. 
 73 Pait, 112 So. 2d at 384 (discussing Blackwell, 79 So. at 735). 
 74 Id. (discussing Blackwell, 79 So. at 735). 
 75 Id. at 383. 
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error and if necessary reverse the conviction.”76 And so even unpre-
served errors of this nature required reversal. 
Given these longstanding precedents, one would think it came 
as no surprise to Florida when the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 
in the 1985 case of Caldwell v. Mississippi an Eighth Amendment 
violation when the State diminishes a jury’s “sense of responsibility 
for determining the appropriateness of death.”77 Had this not already 
been the Florida Supreme Court’s jurisprudence? 
In our view, Blackwell and Pait were Caldwell before Caldwell 
was Caldwell.78 Just like in Blackwell and Pait, the prosecutor in 
Caldwell “urged the jury not to view itself as determining whether 
the defendant would die, because a death sentence would be re-
viewed for correctness by the State Supreme Court.”79 And, like the 
Florida Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that it 
is “impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made 
by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility 
for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests 
elsewhere.”80 
But the guiding lights of Blackwell and Pait did not prevent the 
Eleventh Circuit and the Florida Supreme Court from doing a bit 
of meandering through some rough waters, and getting knocked off 
course, on their way to reaching a unified interpretation of Cald-
well’s applicability to Florida’s death penalty scheme. 
The Florida Supreme Court found the wind first. In Pope v. 
Wainwright, the court denied a Caldwell challenge to a Florida jury 
being instructed that its role was merely advisory because, unlike 
with the Mississippi death penalty scheme at issue in Caldwell, “in 
Florida it is the trial judge who is the ultimate ‘sentencer,’” and 
the jury, “although an integral part of Florida’s capital sentencing 
                                                                                                             
 76 Id. at 384. 
 77 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985). 
 78 Indeed, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, cited Blackwell and 
Pait as examples of cases where “even before Furman the sort of argument 
offered by the prosecutor here was viewed as clearly improper by most state 
courts.” Id. at 334 n.5. 
 79 Id. at 323. 
 80 Id. at 328–29. 
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scheme, is merely advisory.”81 The Florida Supreme Court found 
“nothing erroneous about informing the jury of the limits of its sen-
tencing responsibility” in order to “relieve some of the anxiety felt 
by jurors impaneled in a first-degree murder trial.”82 The notion of 
trying to help capital jurors not be too fretful about their task 
seemed rather at odds with the underlying sentiments of Caldwell—
that sentencing jurors must “recognize[] the gravity of [their] 
task,”83 “view their task as [a] serious one,” and “treat their 
power to determine the appropriateness of death as an ‘awesome 
responsibility.’”84 One would think that with awesome responsibil-
ity comes anxiety. But the Florida Supreme Court found that Flor-
ida’s death penalty scheme was Caldwell-compliant “as long as the 
significance of [the jury’s] recommendation is adequately 
stressed,” which could be accomplished by simply instructing the 
jury as to its advisory role under the law.85 
A month later, the Eleventh Circuit got underway with Florida’s 
Caldwell issue in Adams v. Wainwright, where the judge had in-
structed the jury 
[t]he Court is not bound by your recommendation. 
The ultimate responsibility for what this man gets is 
not on your shoulders. It’s on my shoulders. You are 
merely an advisory group to me in Phase 
Two . . . .So that this conscience part of it as to 
whether or not you’re going to put the man to death 
or not, that is not your decision to make. That’s only 
my decision to make and it has to be on my con-
science. It cannot be on yours.86 
Given this especially enthusiastic judicial effort at anxiety-re-
lief, the Eleventh Circuit reversed under Caldwell because the jury 
                                                                                                             
 81 Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 805 (Fla. 1986). The Florida Su-
preme Court also cited Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), in defense of the 
constitutionality of Florida’s system. See id. 
 82 See id. 
 83 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985). 
 84 Id. at 329–30. 
 85 Pope, 496 So. 2d at 805. 
 86 Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1986). 
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was “misled as to the importance of its role.”87 The court seemed to 
be on rather a different tack than the Florida Supreme Court, find-
ing that “the jury’s role in the Florida sentencing process is so 
crucial that dilution of its sense of responsibility for its recom-
mended sentence” was unconstitutional.88 Unlike the Florida Su-
preme Court’s endorsement of judges calming the nerves of capital 
jurors, the Eleventh Circuit felt that Caldwell prohibited “attempts 
to shield the jury from the full weight of its advisory responsi-
bility.”89 
Later, in the companion en banc rehearing cases of Mann v. 
Dugger90 and Harich v. Dugger,91 the Eleventh Circuit seemed to 
all but stall out entirely on its journey to reconciling Florida’s 
death penalty scheme with Caldwell. In Harich, the court found 
that “the seriousness of the jury’s advisory role was adequately 
communicated by the court and prosecutor,” even though the Flor-
ida jury had been instructed that “[t]he penalty is for the court to 
decide” and “[y]ou are not responsible for the penalty in any way 
because of your verdict.”92 This was at odds with Adams.93 And 
Mann made things still more chaotic, because the Eleventh Circuit 
found a violation of Caldwell in the Florida jury instruction as to 
the jury’s advisory role, which had been found constitutional by 
the Florida Supreme Court in Pope: 
In this case, the comments by the prosecutor were 
such that they would mislead or at least confuse 
the jury as to the nature of its sentencing responsi-
bility under Florida law. It bears emphasizing that 
the prosecutor in Caldwell stated only that the jury’s 
verdict would be “automatically reviewable.” Tech-
nically, this statement was an accurate statement of 
Mississippi law—death sentences are automatically 
reviewed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi under 
                                                                                                             
 87 Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464, 1473 (11th Cir. 1988) (describing Ad-
ams). 
 88 Adams, 804 F.2d at 1530. 
 89 Harich, 844 F.2d at 1473 (describing Adams). 
 90 844 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 91 844 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 92 Harich v. Wainwright, 813 F.2d 1082, 1101 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 93 Adams, 804 F.2d at 1526. 
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Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105. The mischief was that 
the statement, unexplained, would have likely been 
misunderstood by the jurors as meaning that their 
judgment call on the appropriateness of a death sen-
tence did not really matter. We are faced with a 
similar situation here. The prosecutor repeatedly told 
the jury that its task was to render an “advisory” rec-
ommendation. As with “automatically reviewable” 
in Caldwell, this characterization is technically accu-
rate, at least in the sense that the Florida death pen-
alty statute contains the term “advisory.” However, 
the danger exists that the jurors, because they were 
unaware of the body of law that requires the trial 
judge to give weight to the jury recommendation, 
were misinformed as to the importance of their 
judgment call.94 
With the contradictory outcomes in Pope and Mann, it seemed 
Florida’s Caldwell jurisprudence was hopelessly unmoored. The 
underlying reasoning in Mann was simply impossible to square 
with the underlying reasoning in Pope. The Florida Supreme Court 
had taken the view that juries were incidental enough to sentencing 
that they need not be made too anxious about their involvement. But 
the Mann Court believed that, while the Florida Legislature’s 
 use of the term ‘advisory,’ considered in a vacuum, 
could be viewed as evincing a legislative intent that 
the sentencing jury play a role which, in the final 
analysis, is in fact largely meaningless . . . [W]e 
must look to how the Supreme Court of Florida, 
the final interpreter of the death penalty statute, has 
characterized that role.95 
And after surveying various affirmations of the importance of 
capital juries at sentencing from the Florida Supreme Court,96 the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded in Mann that “the Florida case law 
evinces an interpretation of the death penalty statute that requires 
                                                                                                             
 94 Mann, 844 F.2d at 1457. 
 95 Id. at 1450. 
 96 See id. at 1452–53. 
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a trial judge to give great weight to a jury’s sentencing recommen-
dation,”97 and “reflects, we think, an insightful normative judgment 
that a jury recommendation of death has an inherently powerful 
impact on the trial judge.”98 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that “the 
concerns voiced in Caldwell are triggered when a Florida sentenc-
ing jury is misled into believing that its role is unimportant,”99 
regardless of what the Florida Supreme Court may have said after 
Caldwell about the role of Florida juries in death sentencing. 
This led to Combs v. State, where the Florida Supreme 
Court remarked that it was “deeply disturbed about the interpreta-
tion of Florida’s death penalty process and the application of Cald-
well by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in its decisions in Mann v. Dugger . . . .”100 The Florida Su-
preme Court reasserted its view from Pope, stating that “the Florida 
procedure is clearly distinguishable from the Mississippi proce-
dure” in that “[t]he Florida procedure does not empower the jury 
with the final sentencing decision.”101 
Ultimately, the tempest subsided when, in Romano v. Oklahoma, 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided that “to establish a Caldwell 
violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to 
the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by 
local law.”102 In the reconciliatory case of Davis v. Singletary, 
the Eleventh Circuit overruled Mann and Harich, because the 
view that “a prosecutorial or judicial comment or instruction could 
constitute Caldwell error even if it was a technically accurate 
description under state law of the jury’s actual role in capital 
sentencing .  .  .  cannot survive [Romano].”103 In the end, Florida 
law was what it was. Juries were so insignificant to capital sentenc-
ing that their duty simply could not be deemphasized too much. So 
the Florida Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit finally got on 
the same course. Caldwell was not a problem in Florida. 
                                                                                                             
 97 Id. at 1453. 
 98 Id. at 1454. 
 99 Id. 
 
 100 Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853, 855 (Fla. 1988). 
 101 Id. at 856. 
 102 Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994). 
 103 Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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But now, so many years later, Hurst has exposed a different sort 
of Caldwell problem in Florida’s death penalty scheme. Under 
Florida’s pre-Hurst death penalty statute, a jury made a non-bind-
ing sentencing recommendation of death to a trial court based on 
findings “[t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist” and 
“[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh 
the aggravating circumstances” but did not specify what aggravat-
ing circumstances it had found.104 Because Hurst found that Flor-
ida failed to appreciate “[a] jury’s mere recommendation is not 
enough”105 to satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the 
fact that Florida juries were instructed that their fact-findings 
would only go to support a non- binding recommendation—rather 
than creating the critical and operative set of facts on which the court 
would determine the punishment—indicates Florida juries have 
been misinformed as to their constitutionally required role in capi-
tal sentencing proceedings.106 
This problem especially implicates the reasons the Caldwell 
Court provided to support the Caldwell rule, of which there are 
four. Those reasons were described in relation to the prosecutor 
in Caldwell having encouraged the jury to think of appellate 
judges as ultimately responsible, but they apply with striking par-
allel to the Hurst problem of juries being encouraged to think of 
trial judges as ultimately responsible for finding the facts on which 
death would be imposed. 
First, the Caldwell Court believed that diminishing the respon-
sibility of a trial-level sentencer by encouraging her to rely on a 
future appellate court review effectively deprived the defendant of 
the right to a fair sentencing, because “an appellate court, unlike a 
capital sentencing jury, is wholly ill-suited to evaluate the appropri-
ateness of death in the first instance.”107 If a proper sentencing did 
not happen in the first instance, it would not happen at all.108 The 
Caldwell Court felt that appellate courts cannot fill-in for sen-
tencers that fail to appreciate the gravity of their task, due to several 
                                                                                                             
 104 See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(a-b) (effective March 7, 2016). 
 105 Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016). 
 106 See id. 
 107 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985). 
 108 See id. 
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limitations at the appellate stage.109 Some limitations were practi-
cal: “Whatever intangibles a jury might consider in its sentencing 
determination, few can be gleaned from an appellate record,” and, 
even if they could, “most appellate courts review sentencing deter-
minations with a presumption of correctness.”110 Appellate judges 
were simply not in the room to see for themselves, and even if they 
had imagination enough to put themselves there, they had to defer 
to lower court fact-findings in any event. But other limitations were 
less practical, more subtle, and put in place by pre-existing Eighth 
Amendment precedents: 
This inability to confront and examine the individu-
ality of the defendant would be particularly devas-
tating to any argument for consideration of what this 
Court has termed “[those] compassionate or mitigat-
ing factors stemming from the diverse frailties of hu-
mankind.” When we held that a defendant has a 
constitutional right to the consideration of such fac-
tors, Eddings, supra; Lockett, supra, we clearly en-
visioned that that consideration would occur among 
sentencers who were present to hear the evidence 
and arguments and see the witnesses.111 
So the Caldwell Court found that appellate-level sentencing 
failed to live up to the requirement of individualized and human-
ized sentencing inherent in the Eighth Amendment. The human 
connection cannot be achieved from the higher bench on review 
of a cold record. Appellate review is just not the same as sitting in 
those sweltering Florida courtrooms with the Blackwells and the 
Paits, seeing the face of each witness, and developing over time 
an intuition and sense for the truth behind the evidence. Appellate 
courts are just too far removed from that essential American sen-
tencing experience. 
This Caldwell concern implicates the Hurst problem directly. 
Just as jurors are better- suited than appellate judges to determine 
sentence, jurors are better-suited than trial judges to find the opera-
tive, binding facts on which sentencing will occur. Fact-finding is 
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 110 Id. at 330–31. 
 111 Id. (citing Woodson et al. v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)). 
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entrusted by the Sixth Amendment to jurors, not trial judges, for the 
same reason that Caldwell sought to entrust sentencing to jurors, 
and not appellate judges: jurors are more likely to take a humanistic 
view of the defendant and see him as a person like themselves.112 
Justice Story has explained that the Sixth Amendment right to jury 
fact-findings “was designed ‘to guard against a spirit of oppression 
and tyranny on the part of rulers,’ and ‘was from very early times 
insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, as the great bul-
wark of their civil and political liberties.’”113 Legal officials, those 
given the power of the State to sit in judgment of other citizens 
in case after case, are simply more likely to lose touch with the 
common man. As explained by a federal district court about federal 
sentencing: 
A court that mechanically doles out precalculated 
sentences on a wholesale basis to categories of face-
less defendants fails to do justice. A court that suc-
cumbs to apathy, bred by repetition, will cease to 
see defendants as individuals, with pasts and po-
tentials, with humanity and promise. “It is a terrible 
business to mark a man out for the vengeance of 
men,” and “the terrible thing about legal offi-
cials .  .  .  is simply that they have gotten used to 
it.” Gilbert Keith Chesterton, Tremendous Trifles 
54–55 (BiblioBazar, LLC 2006) (1909). “[T]he 
more a man looks at a thing, the less he can see it,” 
so that “they do not see the prisoner in the dock; 
all they see is the usual man in the usual place. They 
do not see the awful court of judgment; they only see 
their own workshop.” Id. at 55.114 
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 113 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1995) (citing JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A 
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This is what Hurst is all about: having a lay juror and member 
of the community, rather than a legal official, find facts on which 
death will be imposed. 
The second reason given for the Caldwell rule is that a jury’s 
desire to sentence harshly in order to “send a message,” rather than 
to sentence in proportion to the crime at hand, “might make a jury 
very receptive to a prosecutor’s assurance that it can more freely 
‘err because the error may be corrected on appeal.’”115 Here again, 
the Hurst problem is front and center. Florida juries that felt their 
anxiety about finding sentencing facts relieved by an instruction that 
the judge would be ultimately responsible for finding her own facts, 
and sentencing based on those, would take less care in ensuring they 
did not make a critical error. 
The third Caldwell concern is that a juror might get the 
impression that only a death sentence will trigger an appeal and 
then understand that any decision to ‘delegate’ responsibility for 
sentencing can only be effectuated by returning that sentence.”116 
This may lead a jury to impose a death sentence “out of a desire to 
avoid responsibility for its decision.”117 In the Hurst context, this 
concern is profound. A jury that is advised that its fact-finding 
would only go to support a non-binding sentencing recommenda-
tion might be more inclined to recommend death. This is so because 
a death recommendation would call upon the judge to exercise her 
sentencing discretion by finding and weighing sentencing factors. 
On the other hand, a life recommendation—suggesting a lack of 
facts to support a death recommendation—might lead a judge to 
accept the insufficiency of the facts needed to open the door to 
death in the first place, and thus not even reach the weighing, the 
moral judgment, that would take responsibility for the sentence of 
the jury. In other words, a jury could conclude that finding facts to 
support a death recommendation was the only way to truly put the 
ball in the judge’s court. 
The fourth Caldwell concern was that 
the uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for 
any ultimate determination of death will rest with 
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others presents an intolerable danger that the jury 
will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its 
role. Indeed, one can easily imagine that in a case 
in which the jury is divided on the proper sentence, 
the presence of appellate review could effectively 
be used as an argument for why those jurors who 
are reluctant to invoke the death sentence should 
nevertheless give in.118 
Indeed, in the Hurst context, a juror might be likely to encour-
age another to go along with the finding of a particular aggravator 
and a recommendation of death, because the judge was going to 
supplant the fact-finding and supersede the sentencing decision an-
yway. 
Hurst makes clear that by encouraging jurors to place respon-
sibility for the finding and consideration of sentencing facts on legal 
officials rather than themselves, encouraging jurors to be less con-
cerned about making an error because any error would be cor-
rected, encouraging jurors to find facts to support a death recom-
mendation in order to transfer responsibility for the sentence to the 
trial judge, and encouraging jurors to pressure each other into go-
ing along with finding facts in favor of death because the finding 
would not go to support any death sentence ultimately imposed 
anyway, Florida violated Caldwell.119 
II.   REVISITING CLEMONS V. MISSISSIPPI: APPELLATE COURTS CAN’T 
REVIEW FACTFINDINGS THAT DON’T EXIST 
When a sentencer weighs an invalid aggravating circum-
stance in arriving at a death sentence, the Eighth Amendment is 
violated.120 The Eighth abhors randomness, and “[e]mploying an in-
valid aggravating factor in the weighing process ‘creates the possi-
bility . . . of randomness.’”121 Invalid aggravating circumstances 
wrongly “plac[e] a ‘thumb on death’s side of the scale.’”122 The sen-
tencer is led to believe the defendant is more deserving of death 
                                                                                                             
 118 Id. at 333. 
 119 See Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016). 
 120 Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992). 
 121 Id. (quoting Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232, 236 (1992)). 
 122 Id. (brackets omitted) (alteration added). 
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than he really is,123 which seems as wrong a thing as the justice sys-
tem could possibly do. 
But, ever since Chapman v. California, not all constitutional 
errors in a criminal trial require reversal.124 And Clemons v. Mis-
sissippi allows the use of invalid aggravating circumstances in sup-
port of death sentences to be cured during appellate court review.125 
In Clemons, the Mississippi Supreme Court had upheld a death 
sentence despite finding one of the aggravating circumstances un-
constitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright.126 The U.S. Supreme 
Court held that “the Federal Constitution does not prevent a state 
appellate court from upholding a death sentence that is based in part 
on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance either 
by reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating evidence or by 
harmless error review.”127 Thus, for the last quarter-century, the 
Florida Supreme Court has had two avenues to affirm death 
sentences despite the sentencer’s consideration of invalid aggra-
vating factors: reweighing sentencing factors128 and harmless error 
analysis.129 
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 124 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). 
 125 See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750 (1990). 
 126 See id. at 741 (citing Matnard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), as re-
quiring that the aggravating circumstance of “especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel” not be too vaguely defined). 
 127 Clemons, 494 U.S. at 741. This holding extended to so-called weighing 
states the holding of Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), that, in states where 
aggravating circumstances serve to create death eligibility without weighing 
against mitigation, “the invalidation of one aggravating circumstance does not 
necessarily require an appellate court to vacate a death sentence and remand to 
a jury.” Id. at 744–45. 
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lier, when in Barclay v. Florida, seven years prior, it had “opined,” id. at 752, 
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balance struck by the trial judge and decide that the elimination of improperly 
considered aggravating circumstances could not possibly affect the balance.” Bar-
clay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 958 (1983). 
 129 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit characterized 
the ruling in Clemons as being that “state appellate courts in weighing states 
may independently weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances and thereby 
cure certain errors that might have occurred at the sentencing phase of a trial; 
they may act as sentencers.” Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1568 (11th 
Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted) (quoting Booker v. Dugger, 922 F.2d 633, 642 
(11th Cir. 1991) (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring)). 
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But, in light of Hurst, the ruling in Clemons no longer applies to 
appellate review of pre- Hurst Florida death sentences. The Florida 
Supreme Court should revisit the question of whether it is proper 
for appellate courts to have reweighed aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances and conducted harmless error analyses when review-
ing Florida death sentences under Clemons. 
The reason Clemons held that appellate courts can cure consid-
eration of invalid aggravating circumstances was simple: there was 
no reason they should not. The Court said, “[w]e . . . see nothing in 
appellate weighing or reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances that is at odds with contemporary standards of fair-
ness or that is inherently unreliable and likely to result in arbitrary 
imposition of the death sentence.”130 To reach this conclusion, the 
Court relied on its prior holdings in Hildwin v. Florida131 and Spa-
ziano v. Florida.132 
In Hildwin, the Court had reviewed the question of “whether the 
Sixth Amendment requires a jury to specify the aggravating factors 
that permit the imposition of capital punishment in Florida.”133 Un-
der Florida’s death penalty statute, a jury would recommend a death 
sentence based on findings “[t]hat sufficient aggravating circum-
stances exist” and “[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circum-
stances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,”134 but the jury 
would not specify which aggravating circumstances it had found 
to support those findings. The jury would merely make a non-bind-
ing sentencing recommendation to the court based on non-disclosed 
findings of fact.135 The Hildwin Court held that “the Sixth Amend-
ment does not require that a jury specify the aggravating factors that 
permit the imposition of capital punishment.”136 And thus for dec-
ades it was thought in Florida that juries made proper findings of 
individual aggravators somewhere along the way to the finding of 
sufficiency, but exactly where was of no concern to the Sixth 
                                                                                                             
 130 Clemons, 494 U.S. at 750. 
 131 490 U.S. 638 (1989); see Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746 (citing Hildwin v. Flor-
ida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989)). 
 132 468 U.S. 447 (1984); see Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746 (citing Spaziano v. 
Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984)). 
 133 Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 638. 
 134 See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(a-b) (effective March 7, 2016). 
 135 See Combs, 525 So. 2d at 858. 
 136 Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640–41. 
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Amendment. In fact, juries were later prohibited from specifying 
which aggravators they had found. In State v. Steele, the Florida Su-
preme Court ruled that “[i]ndividual jury findings on aggravating 
factors would contradict th[e] settled practice” that “the trial court 
alone must make detailed findings about the existence and weight 
of aggravating circumstances.”137 
In Spaziano, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the same death 
penalty scheme under the Eighth Amendment.138 Spaziano held that 
“neither the Sixth Amendment, nor the Eighth Amendment, nor any 
other constitutional provision provides a defendant with the right to 
have a jury determine the appropriateness of a capital sentence.”139 
The jury recommendation of death that Hurst would later find “is 
not enough”140 to satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirement for 
jury fact-finding, was enough in Spaziano to satisfy the Eighth 
Amendment requirement that states provide sentencers with suffi-
cient guidance to “rationally distinguish between those individuals 
for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is 
not.”141 
So the Clemons Court decided that, because Hildwin made it un-
necessary for juries to find aggravators and Spaziano made it un-
necessary for juries to weigh aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances to determine sentences, there was no necessary jury finding 
standing in the way of appellate courts reconsidering sentences after 
striking one or more aggravators.142 After all, there was no opposi-
tional preexisting constitutional principle. Juries were not really 
needed.143 
But that all changed with Hurst v. Florida. In Hurst, the U.S. 
Supreme Court explicitly overruled Spaziano and Hildwin, stating 
that “[t]ime and subsequent cases have washed away the logic of 
Spaziano and Hildwin.”144 This conclusion was inescapable, given 
the ruling in Hurst that “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not 
                                                                                                             
 137 State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 546 (Fla. 2005). 
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a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of 
death.”145 Hildwin had been wrong. Spaziano had been wrong. And 
knowing this, the Florida Supreme Court must now ask whether by 
reweighing of sentencing factors or by harmless error analysis an 
appellate court may have constitutionally upheld a Florida death 
sentence pursuant to Clemons without jury fact-finding. The court 
must ask whether, in Florida, Clemons still stands. 
After all, it was the Clemons Court that wrote “when state law 
creates for a defendant a liberty interest in having a jury make par-
ticular findings, speculative appellate findings will not suffice to 
protect that entitlement for due process purposes.”146 This concept 
should apply with even more force when the Sixth Amendment cre-
ates that interest. 
The Clemons Court also cautioned that “[n]othing in this opinion 
is intended to convey the impression that state appellate courts are 
required to or necessarily should engage in reweighing or harmless-
error analysis when errors have occurred in a capital sentencing pro-
ceeding.”147 Just because “such procedures are constitutionally per-
missible,”148 does not mean they are appropriate in every instance. 
“In some situations, a state appellate court may conclude that 
peculiarities . . . make appellate reweighing or harmless-error 
analysis extremely speculative or impossible.”149 Florida’s unique 
death penalty scheme—which conflates the Sixth Amendment fact-
finding with the Eighth Amendment weighing of sentencing factors 
and combines them into one step150—is the sort of peculiarity that 
makes appellate review too speculative. Florida chose to protect 
death sentences by subsuming jury findings into sentencing recom-
mendations and thus hiding them from appellate review. And the 
                                                                                                             
 145 Hurst, slip op. at 1. 
 146 Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746 (citing Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 
(1980)). 







 150 See Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1249 n.14 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(referring to Florida’s death penalty scheme as “one in which the legislative nar-
rowing of death-eligible defendants and the individualized sentencing determina-
tion are collapsed into a single step and based on an evaluation of the same sen-
tencing factors”). 
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price of that is not being able to uncover and review those findings 
when doing so would serve the same purpose. 
1. APPELLATE REWEIGHING OF SENTENCING FACTORS AFTER 
HURST 
When Clemons permitted appellate courts to reweigh sentencing 
factors after striking an aggravator, the Florida Supreme Court de-
murred. “On several occasions, the Florida Supreme Court has 
stated that it does not reweigh evidence when reviewing a death sen-
tence.”151 In Hudson v. State, the same year as Hildwin, the court 
pronounced that “[i]t is not within this Court’s province to reweigh 
or reevaluate the evidence presented as to aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances.”152 
This pronouncement has been relied on by the Eleventh Circuit 
on federal habeas review to deny challenges to the Florida Supreme 
Court’s alleged reweighing of sentencing factors: 
We do not read the court’s opinion as undertaking a 
reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances . . . .[T]he Florida Supreme Court has 
itself said that it does not reweigh evidence when 
reviewing a death sentence . . . .Thus, [the defend-
ant]’s arguments regarding the court’s alleged errors 
in assigning insufficient weight to the proffered mit-
igating evidence or for failing to view the evidence 
cumulatively are beside the point. The court need 
only have answered the question of whether the ag-
gravator would have been found with a proper in-
struction beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, 
we find no grounds for viewing the Florida Su-
preme Court’s harmless error analysis as contrary 
to or an unreasonable application of clearly estab-
lished federal law.153 
In other words, a defendant cannot maintain a habeas chal-
lenge to a Florida Supreme Court analysis that seems an awful 
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lot like a reweighing of sentencing factors, because the Florida 
Supreme Court says it does not conduct reweighing.154 Likewise, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has taken the Florida Supreme Court at its word 
on this point: “We noted in Parker that the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida will generally not reweigh evidence independently, and the par-
ties agree that, to this extent at least, our perception of Florida law 
was correct.”155  There again, the quality and constitutionality of the 
Florida Supreme Court’s reweighing of sentencing factors escapes 
federal review. 
This would seem to leave harmless error analysis as the only 
Clemons option for the Florida Supreme Court to affirm a death 
sentence after striking an invalid aggravating circumstance. But 
Florida’s death penalty law is no slave to consistency. 
While the Eleventh Circuit has declined to scrutinize the Florida 
Supreme Court’s reweighing because the Florida Supreme Court 
has stated that it does not reweigh, the Eleventh Circuit has also 
found that the Florida Supreme Court does conduct reweighing. For 
example, in order to uphold a death sentence in Bolender v. Sin-
gletary, where the Florida Supreme Court failed to conduct a harm-
less error analysis, reweighing was the only alternative to reversal: 
In this case, the Florida Supreme Court conducted 
the type of reweighing called for in Clemons  . . .  af-
ter striking the two aggravating circum-
stances . . . .[T]he Florida Supreme Court did not 
state that it had reviewed [the defendant]’s case for 
harmless error. But the opinion .  .  .  does indicate 
that the Florida Supreme Court reweighed the aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances in the manner 
contemplated by Clemons. First, the court deter-
mined that “[t]he disparity between [the defendant]’s 
death sentences and Macker’s twelve concurrent life 
sentences is supported by the facts.” Having evalu-
ated the only aspect of the case that was argued as 
mitigation, the court then found that, “[b]ased on 
the evidence and testimony at trial, we agree with 
the trial court that virtually no reasonable person 
                                                                                                             
 154 See id. 
 155 Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527,539–40 (1992) (citations omitted). 
1150 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
could differ on the sentence.” Finally, the court con-
cluded by comparing the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances proved and finding that, on the rec-
ord before the court, “[i]n the absence of any mitigat-
ing circumstance disapproval of two aggravating 
factors does not require reversal of the death sen-
tence.” Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court 
conducted the proper form of review after it invali-
dated the use of two aggravating circumstances and 
concluded that the balance of the aggravating and 
mitigating factors clearly justified the imposition of 
the death penalty; it did not err in declining to re-
mand the case for resentencing.156 
How can it be that the Florida Supreme Court is found not to 
conduct reweighing when doing so would expose its decision to re-
versal but found indeed to conduct reweighing when not doing so 
would require reversal? The Eleventh Circuit offered an explanation 
in Bolender: 
On several occasions, the Florida Supreme Court has 
stated that it does not reweigh evidence when re-
viewing a death sentence . . . .The Florida Supreme 
Court does, however, conduct a proportionality re-
view of the sentence, which “involves comparing the 
balance between aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances in the case at hand with the balance in other 
cases (not considered by the jury in recommending, 
or the trial judge in fashioning, the sentence to be 
given) in which the death penalty has been im-
posed.” To the United States Supreme Court, and de-
spite the Florida Supreme Court’s protestations to 
the contrary, this form of analysis may constitute ex-
actly the type of “reweighing” referred to in 
Clemons. To cure a constitutional violation in the 
trial court under Clemons, therefore, an appellate 
court in a weighing state need only reconsider the 
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
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to determine whether the evidence still justifies the 
death penalty.157 
And there you have it. Because it does not matter what the 
Florida Supreme Court thinks it is doing, a federal habeas court 
need not be consistent in what it thinks the Florida Supreme Court 
is doing from case to case.158 In this way, the Florida Supreme 
Court’s self-imposed limitation is easily sidestepped when incon-
venient to a desired result. 
Thus, reweighing becomes one of the Clemons options of appel-
late curing of constitutional violations that we must reconsider after 
Hurst, both for purposes of Florida Supreme Court analyses and 
federal habeas review. 
The requisite reweighing is held to a very high standard of qual-
ity. As Judge Kravitch of the Eleventh Circuit once explained, 
“Clemons does not allow reviewing courts to give cursory attention 
to a defendant’s sentence after an aggravating factor has been in-
validated.”159 Rather, the Eighth Amendment requires “a thorough 
analysis of the role an invalid aggravating factor played in the sen-
tencing process.”160 There must be “close appellate scrutiny of the 
import and effect of invalid aggravating factors.”161 
The trouble is, the U.S. Supreme Court has already found 
this sort of close appellate scrutiny to be impossible when it comes 
to jury findings supporting Florida death sentences. In Sochor v. 
Florida, the defendant argued that Eighth Amendment error oc-
curred when “the sentencer” weighed the aggravating circumstance 
of cold, calculated, and premeditated, because the evidence did not 
support that aggravator.162 The U.S. Supreme Court found Sochor’s 
argument to require three steps: 
[T]he first step in his argument being that the cold-
ness factor was “invalid”. . . ; the second step, that 
the jury in the instant case “weighed” the coldness 
                                                                                                             
 157 Id. at 1568 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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factor; and the third and last step, that in Florida the 
jury is at least a constituent part of “the sentencer” 
for Clemons purposes.”163 
The Court found that second step—that the jury weighed the 
problematic aggravating factor—”fatally flawed.”164 Why? “Be-
cause the jury in Florida does not reveal the aggravating factors 
on which it relies, we cannot know whether this jury actually relied 
on the coldness factor. If it did not, there was no Eighth Amend-
ment violation.”165 So, prior to Hurst and ever since Sochor, Florida 
capital defendants could not challenge a jury’s improper weighing 
of invalid aggravating factors because that weighing was done in 
secret. It was insulated from review because it was not of record. 
How elegant, that the very analysis that has enabled the Florida 
Supreme Court to supposedly cure unconstitutional death sentences 
based on invalid aggravating factors since Sochor in 1992 must now, 
after Hurst, prohibit the Florida Supreme Court from doing the 
same. Sochor acknowledged that an appellate court cannot know 
on what aggravators a jury relied. Since Hurst recognized those 
aggravators as underlying the operative, Sixth Amendment- compli-
ant fact-finding on which Florida death sentences must be imposed, 
an appellate court could not and cannot act as a fill-in sentencer and 
reweigh aggravating circumstances to uphold a pre-Hurst Florida 
death sentence. The only underlying facts available on which to 
rely were found by a judge. Cases in which Florida death sen-
tences were affirmed based on appellate reweighing of sentencing 
factors—and the Florida Supreme Court’s proportionality analyses 
treated by the Eleventh Circuit as Clemons reweighing—are irrepa-
rably unconstitutional and do not survive Hurst. 
2. HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS AFTER HURST 
In addition to reweighing, Clemons “approved of the use by 
state courts of ‘harmless error’ analysis to cure a trial court’s erro-
neous application of aggravating factors in death penalty cases.”166 
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There are two permissible types of harmless error review.167 First, 
appellate courts can determine that the sentence would have been 
the same had an invalid aggravating circumstance not been in-
structed in the first place.168 Second, appellate courts can determine 
that the sentence would have been the same had an invalid aggravat-
ing circumstance been properly instructed.169 However, the prob-
lem with Florida’s aggravating circumstances after Hurst is not 
merely that the jury was instructed to find an improper one, or im-
properly instructed to find a proper one; the problem is that the jury 
was instructed not to make any record findings as to individual ag-
gravating circumstances at all.170 
This means that pre-Hurst harmless error analyses conducted 
by the Florida Supreme Court after striking an aggravator171 suffer 
from an Eighth Amendment problem in addition to the Sixth 
Amendment problem identified in Hurst: the Florida Supreme 
Court could not step in as the sentencer under the Eighth Amend-
ment without having the requisite fact-findings on which to rely 
under the Sixth Amendment. 
This goes back to Steele, one of the cases that served as the 
Florida Supreme Court’s post-Ring gut check as to whether it 
would stay committed to its death penalty scheme despite the doubt 
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findings by a new jury. In Demps v. Dugger, 714 So. 2d 365, 367 (Fla. 1998), the 
Florida Supreme Court found “the trial court’s ruling would have been the same 
beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of the invalid factors.” 
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cast over it by Ring.172 In Steele, the Florida Supreme Court did not 
just hold that Florida juries need not specify what aggravators they 
found pursuant to Ring, it held that juries could not specify under 
Florida law.173 Florida juries were prohibited from making the op-
erative fact-findings on which sentencing judges would rely.174 And 
even in cases like Steele, where a Florida trial court took the hint 
from Ring v. Arizona and resolved to have juries specify their 
findings of aggravators whether the Florida Supreme Court had 
yet required it or not,175 trial judges were nevertheless still directed 
by Florida’s death penalty statute to make their own findings of ag-
gravating circumstances, and then to rely on those judge-found facts 
to weigh mitigation and arrive at a sentence.176 So the jury’s 
underlying findings were inoperative, or supplanted, even when 
not kept secret. 
This led to the rather dumbfounding conclusion that utter frac-
tionalization and disagreement on Florida juries could serve as le-
gally sound fact-finding as to individual aggravators: 
the jury may recommend a sentence of death so long 
as a majority concludes that at least one aggravating 
circumstance exists. Nothing in the statute, the 
standard jury instructions, or the standard verdict 
form, however, requires a majority of the jury to 
agree on which aggravating circumstances exist. Un-
der the current law, for example, the jury may rec-
ommend a sentence of death where four jurors be-
lieve that only the “avoiding a lawful arrest” aggra-
vator applies, see § 921.141(5)(e), while three others 
believe that only the “committed for pecuniary gain” 
aggravator applies, see § 921.141(5)(f), because 
                                                                                                             
 172 Steele v. State, 921 So. 2d 538, 546 (Fla. 2005). 
 173 See id. 
 174 See id. 
 175 Id. at 541 (noting that the trial court ruled that it “would submit to the jury 
a penalty-phase interrogatory verdict form that would require jurors to specify 
each aggravator found and the vote for that aggravator”). 
 176 See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3). 
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seven jurors believe that at least one aggravator ap-
plies.177 
Even an aggravator rejected by eleven jurors could end up par-
tially supporting a death sentence if one juror who voted for death 
believed that aggravator was established .178 And perhaps this is 
the best way to know there were no jury fact-findings as to individ-
ual aggravators in Florida to support harmless error review pre-
Hurst: Florida treated a jury’s disagreement as to a fact—which is 
the opposite of a finding of fact—as a finding of fact. But still, the 
only fact-findings of record were those the judge found and de-
scribed in her sentencing order. And Hurst revealed those to be con-
stitutionally infirm and unusable to appellate courts. 
This means that regardless of the extent to which the Sixth 
Amendment rule in Hurst is extended to Florida defendants whose 
cases were final before Hurst, and regardless of the manner in which 
the Florida Supreme Court might attempt to conduct harmless error 
analyses to cure the Sixth Amendment violation found in Hurst, 
there is an additional Eighth Amendment problem in pre-Hurst 
cases in which the Florida Supreme Court affirmed death sentences 
through harmless error review pursuant to Clemons, after striking an 
invalid aggravator, in reliance on the remaining judge-found ag-
gravators. This distinction—between harmless error review of the 
Hurst problem and pre-Hurst harmless error review under 
Clemons—matters, because the Eighth Amendment violation has 
different implications than the Sixth Amendment violation.179 The 
                                                                                                             
 177 Steele, 921 So. 2d at 545–46. 
 178 See id. 
 179 Hurst was not silent on harmless error, but it also did not offer much guid-
ance. The Court stated “we do not reach the State’s assertion that any error was 
harmless,” because “[t]his Court normally leaves it to state courts to consider 
whether an error is harmless, and we see no reason to depart from that pattern 
here. Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 10 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016). The Court 
did cite Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999), for “holding that the failure 
to submit an uncontested element of an offense to a jury may be harmless,” Id. at 
10, but did nothing to change its admonishment from Clemons that “nothing in 
this opinion is intended to convey the impression that state appellate courts are 
required to or necessarily should engage in reweighing or harmless-error anal-
ysis. . . .” Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 746 (1990). However, whatever 
bearing the Court’s comments as to harmless error might be said to have on 
Florida Supreme Court harmless error review of the Hurst Sixth Amendment 
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first is about the likelihood of a different outcome had the jury made 
the critical death-eligibility fact-findings under the Florida statute, 
which Hurst identified as being the findings of sufficient aggrava-
tors not outweighed by mitigators contained in Florida Statutes 
§ 921.141(3).180 The second is about the likelihood of a different 
outcome had the jury made fact-findings as to individual aggrava-
tors. 
Jury death recommendations pre-Hurst embodied the general 
finding of sufficient aggravators under Florida Statutes 
§ 921.141(2), but not the particular aggravators found. Thus, the 
Eighth Amendment problem with the Florida Supreme Court’s pre-
Hurst harmless error analyses under Clemons is that an appellate 
court cannot achieve the level of reason and soundness required of 
a Clemons harmless error analysis while only being able to 
speculate about what operative aggravators were actually found. 
The standard of scrutiny required of Clemons harmless error anal-
yses is too high.181 
An appellate court can only find an error harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.182 In Sochor, the U.S. Supreme Court made 
clear that a high level of clarity and certainty was required of harm-
less error analyses when it declined to give the Florida Supreme 
Court the benefit of the doubt and “accept an implied harmless error 
analysis” in the absence of an explicit rationale.183 The Florida Su-
preme Court had found insufficient evidence to support the aggra-
vating circumstance that the crime was cold, calculated, and pre-
meditated, but affirmed on the following analysis: 
Even after removing the aggravating factor of cold, 
calculated, and premeditated there still remain three 
                                                                                                             
violation, the Hurst Court certainly did not comment on the decision’s bearing 
on pre-Hurst harmless error analyses under Clemons. 
 180 See Hurst, slip op. at 5–6 (“Florida does not require the jury to make the 
critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty. Rather, Florida requires a 
judge to find these facts. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3).”). 
 181 White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 1992) (Kravitch, 
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 182 Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1249 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 183 White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 1992) (discussing 
Sochor v. State, 580 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1991)). 
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aggravating factors to be weighed against no mitigat-
ing circumstances. Striking one aggravating factor 
when there are no mitigating circumstances does not 
necessarily require resentencing. Under the circum-
stances of this case, and in comparison with other 
death cases, we find Sochor’s sentence of death pro-
portionate to his crime.184 
The U.S. Supreme Court found this analysis to be an inadequate 
assessment of whether the error was harmless, “[s]ince the Su-
preme Court of Florida did not explain or even ‘declare a belief 
that’ this error ‘was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt[.]’”185 But 
the Court was clear that it did not intend “to require a particular 
formulaic indication by state courts before their review for harm-
less federal error will pass federal scrutiny.”186 Rather, it was the 
lack of a good, sound explanation that was the central problem. So 
Clemons harmless error review came into focus in Sochor as being 
fundamentally about reason, not magic words.187 Justice O’Connor 
reaffirmed this in her concurrence, emphasizing that “[a]n appellate 
court’s bald assertion that an error of constitutional dimensions was 
‘harmless’ cannot substitute for a principled explanation of how 
the court reached that conclusion.”188 
Thus, Clemons harmless error review cannot be accomplished 
by lip service. And it cannot be accomplished implicitly. Clemons 
harmless error review requires a well-reasoned, well-articulated 
examination of how a constitutional error played into a sentenc-
ing.189 It has to be practically couched in the reality of the trial, not 
                                                                                                             
 184 Sochor, 580 So. 2d at 604 (Fla. 1991) (citations omitted). 
 185 Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 540–41 (1992). Another example of fed-
eral review of a Florida Supreme Court harmless error analysis can be found 
in Hill v. State, where “the federal district court found that th[e Florida Supreme] 
Court may have erred in its harmless error analysis, in violation of 
Clemons .  .  .  ,” and remanded, but also stated that the language used by the 
Florida Supreme Court “was possibly sufficient under Clemons.” 643 So. 2d 
1071, 1073 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted). 
 186 Sochor, 504 U.S. at 540. 
 187 See id. 
 188 Id. at 541 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 189 Note the more that invalid aggravators are relied on by the prosecution, 
the more stringent the harmless error review must be. “When the prosecution has 
stressed . . . the invalid factor during the sentencing hearing, a reviewing court 
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whimsical or speculative. And as a result, the ability of an appellate 
court to meaningfully reason out a harmless error analysis is at the 
heart of whether a harmless error analysis can rightly be undertaken 
at all. 
Indeed, while the U.S. Supreme Court has found many constitu-
tional errors amenable to harmless error analysis (such as jury in-
structions containing an erroneous conclusive presumption, or mis-
stating an element of the offense, or containing an erroneous rebut-
table presumption, or neglecting the presumption of innocence, or—
as in Clemons—vaguely defining an aggravating circumstance),190 
the Court has found that some are not (such as total deprivation of 
the right to counsel, trial by a biased judge, and violation of the right 
to self-representation). 191 So-called structural errors—those “con-
tain[ing] a ‘defect affecting the framework within which the trial 
proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself’”—
cannot be cured through harmless error review,192 because they “in-
fect the entire trial process.”193 Recall that in Blackwell, the Florida 
Supreme Court found that when a jury is “told that in some meas-
ure they could disregard their own responsibility”194 it “can hardly 
be treated as harmless.”195 Such are errors that infect the entire 
trial.196 
In Sullivan v. Louisiana, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a de-
ficient reasonable-doubt instruction to ask in “which category the 
present error belong[ed].”197 There, a dividing line between the two 
categories was drawn: 
                                                                                                             
must justify its finding of harmless error with a ‘detailed explanation based on the 
record.’” White, 972 F.2d at 1229 (Kravitch, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (quoting Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 753 (1990). 
 190 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306–07 (1991) (surveying con-
stitutional errors amenable to harmless error analysis). 
 191 See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (surveying errors that 
invalidate the result of a criminal trial and cannot be harmless); Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (doing the same). 
 192 Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310). 
 193 Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630–31 (1993)). 
 194 Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla. 1959). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 630–31. 
 197 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). 
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The question .  .  .  is not what effect the constitu-
tional error might generally be expected to have 
upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had 
upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand. Harmless-
error review looks, we have said, to the basis on 
which “the jury actually rested its verdict.” The in-
quiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that 
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would 
surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty 
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 
unattributable to the error. That must be so, because 
to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact 
rendered—no matter how inescapable the findings 
to support that verdict might be—would violate the 
jury- trial guarantee.198 
Because Hurst makes clear that a “jury’s mere recommendation” 
of sentence, implicitly embodying aggravation findings, “is not 
enough” to satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirement that juries 
make the findings that open the door to death,199 we know now 
that there are no aggravation findings in pre-Hurst Florida death 
penalty cases to be reviewed by appellate courts so that they can 
satisfy the Eighth Amendment requirement of reliability and non-
arbitrariness when pinch-hitting for trial judges as sentencer. Under 
Sullivan, it is the actual finding made by the actual jury in each case 
that must be analyzed,200 not the finding that an appellate court 
might speculate a jury might have made. “The Sixth Amendment 
requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury’s 
action.”201 The Florida Supreme Court could not, under the Eighth 
Amendment, hypothesize what aggravating circumstances a jury 
                                                                                                             
 198 Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 199 Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016). 
 200 This is supported by Justice Blackmun’s separate opinion in Clemons, 
which criticizes the majority’s reliance on the conclusion from Spaziano “that ev-
idence relevant to the capital sentencing decision can be adequately assessed by 
a trial judge who has witnessed the testimony,” because appellate courts, review-
ing under Clemons do so “on the basis of a cold record,” without viewing the 
evidence first hand. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 765 (1990) 
(Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, J.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 201 Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280. 
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might have found in order to ask if those circumstances would still 
have been found had Florida’s statute complied with the Sixth 
Amendment. 
And the Florida Supreme Court was wrong in its pre-Hurst 
Clemons jurisprudence to hold that its harmless error analysis had 
to be “based on what the sentencer actually found.”202 It was never 
about the judge’s findings as the sentencer. It was, or should have 
been, about the jury’s findings all along. And thus, as in Sullivan, 
“the question whether the same verdict . . . would have been ren-
dered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless,” be-
cause “[t]here is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error 
scrutiny can operate.”203 
It might be argued that the constitutional error reviewed in Sul-
livan is distinguishable from that of Hurst because Sullivan in-
volved a guilty verdict, which is the province of the jury, rather 
than a sentencing verdict.204 But the basis for the holding in Hurst 
is that “any fact that ‘expose[s] the defendant to a greater punish-
ment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict’ is an ‘element’ 
that must be submitted to a jury.”205 Fact-findings relating to aggra-
vators supporting a sentencing verdict are constitutionally indistin-
guishable from fact-findings of elements supporting a guilty ver-
dict. That’s the whole point of Hurst. So, just as in Sullivan, in 
pre-Hurst Florida death cases “there has been no jury verdict 
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.”206 And, according 
to Sullivan, “[d]enial of the right to a jury verdict of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt is certainly an error of the [structural] sort, the jury 
guarantee being a ‘basic protectio[n]’ whose precise effects are 
unmeasurable.”207 “The deprivation of that right, with conse-
quences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, un-
questionably qualifies as ‘structural error.’”208 
                                                                                                             
 202 Hill v. State, 643 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1994). 
 203 Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280 (emphasis in original). 
 204 See id. at 281 (explaining that when an appellate court speculates what 
a jury might have found the “wrong entity” determines guilt). 
 205 Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016) (citing 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)). 
 206 Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280. 
 207 Id. at 281 (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S 570, 577 (1986)). 
 208 Id. at 281–82. 
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Neder v. United States supports this conclusion.209 There, the 
U.S. Supreme Court found that a federal district court’s failure to 
submit the tax-fraud element of materiality to the jury was curable 
by harmless error analysis,210 or, put another way, was not so “in-
trinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal.”211 Why? The 
omission of an element—failing to submit one of several elements 
to the jury—was found merely to prevent a finding on one element 
rather than, as in Sullivan, “vitiat[ing] all the jury’s findings.”212 
The Neder Court drew a distinction between “the absence of a com-
plete verdict on every element of the offense” and there being no 
verdict at all.213 In the case of pre-Hurst harmless error analyses, 
there was no verdict at all from the jury on individual aggravators. 
While leaving out one element may not render a trial fundamentally 
unfair, leaving out all of them surely must. 
3. Secondhand sentencing after Hurst 
The inability of appellate courts to act as sentencers without 
available jury fact-finding circles back to the Caldwell concern that 
“an appellate court, unlike a capital sentencing jury, is wholly ill-
suited to evaluate the appropriateness of death,”214 because of their 
“inability to confront and examine the individuality of the defend-
ant”215 fails to live up to the humanized sentencing envisioned in 
Woodson v. North Carolina,216 Lockett v. Ohio,217 and Eddings 
v. Oklahoma.218 Sentencers just need to be in the room in order to 
judge the defendant as a human being. There is no Eighth Amend-
ment-compliant sentencing on a cold record barren of fact-findings. 
Because there are no constitutionally sound fact-findings of aggra-
vating circumstances on which to conduct Clemons review, either 
by reweighing o r  b y  harmless error analysis, the Florida Su-
preme Court should—at the very least in considering the Eighth 
                                                                                                             
 209 527 U.S. 1 (1999). 
 210 See Neder, 527 U.S. at 4. 
 211 See id. at 7. 
 212 Id. at 10–11 (citing Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281). 
 213 Id. at 12 (quotations omitted). 




 216 Woodson et al. v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
 217 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603–04 (1978). 
 218 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982). 
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Amendment implications of Hurst—revisit cases where it affirmed 
a death sentence after striking one or more aggravating circum-
stances. 
III. REVISITING PROFFITT V. FLORIDA: THE ARBITRARINESS OF 
FLORIDA DEATH SENTENCES IMPOSED WITHOUT JURY 
FACTFINDINGS 
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Geor-
gia, Florida embarked on a journey in search of a death penalty 
scheme that would somehow “respect human dignity” in the pur-
suit of taking human life, and thus no longer violate the Eighth 
Amendment.219 Florida first set its course by adopting a new death 
penalty statute under which 
the jury is directed to consider “ [w]hether suffi-
cient mitigating circumstances exist . . . which out-
weigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; 
and . . . [b]ased on these considerations, whether the 
defendant should be sentenced to life [imprisonment] 
or death.”  . . . The jury’s verdict is determined by 
majority vote. It is only advisory; the actual sen-
tence is determined by the trial judge . . .  . 
The trial judge is also directed to weigh the statu-
tory aggravating and mitigating circumstances when 
he determines the sentence to be imposed on a de-
fendant. The statute requires that if the trial court 
imposes a sentence of death, “ it shall set forth in 
writing its findings upon which the sentence of death 
is based as to the facts: 
(a) [t]hat sufficient [statutory] aggravating circum-
stances exist . . . and (b) [t]hat there are insufficient 
[statutory] mitigating circumstances .  .  .  to out-
weigh the aggravating circumstances.”220 
                                                                                                             
 219 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 220 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248–50 (1976) (quoting FLA. STAT. 
§ 921.141(2), (3)) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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With this sentencing scheme, Florida put its trust in the sentenc-
ing judgment of lone trial judges, and limited jury involvement to 
making—by a simple majority vote and without specifying specific 
findings as to aggravators or mitigators—a non-binding sentencing 
recommendation of life or death.221 
A few years later, the U.S. Supreme Court considered Proffitt 
v. Florida to determine whether Florida had successfully navigated 
around the Eighth Amendment barriers erected by Furman.222 The 
Proffitt Court declared that “[o]n its face the Florida system [] satis-
fies the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman,” and thus 
held that the Eighth Amendment was satisfied where a trial judge 
makes a capital sentencing determination on sentencing facts she 
found herself, without ever knowing what facts the jury found.223 
The Proffitt Court held Florida’s judicial fact-finding consti-
tutional, notwithstanding its view that “jury sentencing in a capital 
case can perform an important societal function.”224 The Court 
cited to Witherspoon v. Illinois, where it had earlier described that 
function: “a jury that must choose between life imprisonment and 
capital punishment can do little more—and must do nothing less—
than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate 
question of life or death.”225 In other words, the jury box is where 
a society, not the bench, chooses death. Death being a societal 
choice is consistent with the Court’s prior view of the Eighth 
Amendment that “[w]hile the State has the power to punish, the 
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within 
the limits of civilized standards.”226 Civilized standards are both de-
fined and met when a jury expresses a society’s conscience. Yet, the 
Court observed in Proffitt that “it has never suggested that jury sen-
tencing is constitutionally required.”227 
This is due to the Court’s view, expressed in Proffitt, that “judi-
cial sentencing should lead. . .to even greater consistency in the im-
                                                                                                             
 221 Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (1976). 
 222 Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
 223 Id. at 253. 
 224 Id. at 252 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois et al., 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)). 
 225 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519. 
 226 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
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position . . . of capital punishment, since a trial judge is more expe-
rienced in sentencing than a jury.”228 The Proffitt Court cited ap-
provingly the Florida Supreme Court’s similar view, expressed a 
year after Furman in State v. Dixon: “a trial judge with experience 
in the facts of criminality possesses the requisite knowledge to bal-
ance the facts of the case against the standard criminal activity 
which can only be developed by involvement with the trials of nu-
merous defendants.”229 When the Proffitt Court found that the 
greater experience and knowledge of trial judges would “assure 
that the death penalty [ would] not be imposed in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner,”230 consistency won out over society’s con-
science. Thus, before getting to the constitutional implications of 
Proffitt that result from Hurst finding that juries had been insuffi-
ciently relied on in Florida’s death penalty scheme,231 it is worth 
taking a moment to consider the Proffitt Court’s conception of 
what the jury’s role and impact would be under that scheme. Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court endorsing the experiential sagacity of 
trial judges over the common man in finding and weighing sentenc-
ing factors may seem antithetical to the jury’s role of effectuating 
social conscience in sentencing, particularly in light of Justice 
Story’s nineteenth century observation, which we noted above, that 
the Sixth Amendment right to jury fact-findings “was designed ‘to 
guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rul-
ers.’”232 In that light, it seems the law’s highest officials may be 
among the least preferred trustees of the conscience of a nation 
founded in part on a strong sense of anti-establishmentarianism. 
A community’s standards are best preserved not by a judge, but by 
a twelve-member cross-section of that community. Indeed, as Jus-
tices Breyer and Stevens have observed, “jurors possess an im-
portant comparative advantage over judges” because they more ac-
curately reflect “the composition and experiences of the community 
                                                                                                             
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. at 252 n.10 (citing State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973)). 
 230 Id. at 253. 
 231 Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016). 
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as a whole.”233 Much more so than judges, jurors “express the con-
science of the community on the ultimate question of life or 
death.”234 
That judges are the best helmsman of capital sentencing is at 
odds with scholarship reflecting that “[a] judge who is a prosperous 
white Anglo male . . . will have a picture of reality that differs 
markedly from the pictures carried around by a large proportion of 
the people being judged: women, poor people, or people of another 
race, ethnicity, or religion.”235 Additionally, 
the problem of judicial bias involves the risk that the 
judge will fall into the old pattern of treating those 
who are different not as people but as abstractions—
as projected images of his own negative identities. 
The idea of sympathetic connection with the nega-
tive identity that one is trying to repress is fundamen-
tally contradictory. Acculturated differences thus 
threaten the quality of judging, both in the explora-
tion and evaluation of the facts of a case and in the 
application and construction of the governing legal 
doctrine.236 
In other words, judges acculturated differently from those 
being judged can lead to arbitrary sentencing,237 rather than judges 
being the hallmark of consistency that the Supreme Court contem-
plated in Proffitt.238 
Research reflects that where, as in Florida, trial judges are 
elected based on tough-on- crime campaigns, they are more likely 
to override a jury’s life recommendation and less likely to preserve 
a defendant’s rights: “Between 1972 and early 1992, Florida trial 
judges, who face contested elections every six years, imposed death 
sentences over 134 jury recommendations of life imprisonment, but 
                                                                                                             
 233 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 486 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
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overrode only fifty-one death recommendations.”239 Thus, during 
those years, a Florida judge was more than 2.6 times as likely to 
override a life recommendation than a death recommendation.240 
This problem was even recognized by the Florida Supreme Court 
when, in In Re McMillan, it removed a trial judge from a case in part 
for his campaign that promised to be more pro-prosecution than his 
incumbent opponent.241 There are also studies concluding that 
judges who override life recommendations and issue death sen-
tences are more likely to commit serious errors in trial.242 Of 
course, this is not to say that jurors are free of potential bias.243 
Rather, we intend to highlight that undue reliance on judicial ex-
perience is not a constitutional panacea for Florida’s death penalty 
scheme. 
And, to some extent, the Proffitt Court had to recognize this, be-
cause it relied heavily on the role of juries to constitutionalize Flor-
ida’s death penalty scheme.244 Charles William Proffitt argued “that 
it is not possible to make a rational determination whether there are 
‘sufficient’ aggravating circumstances that are not outweighed by 
the mitigating circumstances.”245 And, in response, the Proffitt 
Court looked to the jury box: 
While these questions and decisions may be hard, 
they require no more line-drawing than is commonly 
required of a factfinder in a lawsuit. For example, 
                                                                                                             
 239 Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: 
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 
B.U. L. REV. 759, 793 (1995); see also Michael L. Radelet & Michael Mello, 
Death-to-Life Overrides: Saving the Resources of the Florida Supreme Court, 20 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 196, 210–11 (1992). 
 240 See id. 
 241 See In re Matthew W. McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2001). 
 242 See, e.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY 
THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT 
IT 1 ,  156 (2002), http:/www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf; 
Keith Swisher, The Modern Movement of Vindicating Violations of Criminal 
Defendants’ Rights Through Judicial Discipline, 14 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL 
RTS. & SOC. JUST. 255, 272 (2008). 
 243 See Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Im-
plicit Juror Bias, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 827 (2012). 
 244 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976). 
 245 Id. at 257. 
2016] HURST V. FLORIDA'S HA'P'ORTH OF TAR 1167 
juries have traditionally evaluated the validity of de-
fenses such as insanity or reduced capacity, both of 
which involve the same considerations as some of the 
above-mentioned mitigating circumstances . . . 
The directions given to judge and jury by the Florida 
statute are sufficiently clear and precise to enable the 
various aggravating circumstances to be weighed 
against the mitigating ones. As a result, the trial 
court’s sentencing discretion is guided and chan-
neled by a system that focuses on the circumstances 
of each individual homicide and individual defend-
ant in deciding whether the death penalty is to be im-
posed.246 
Thus, part of the reason that the Proffitt Court found Florida’s 
scheme constitutional was that juries were equipped to make the 
difficult determinations that were required by the statute and would 
serve to guide and channel the sentencing judge’s discretion.247 
Properly instructing the jury on how to find sentencing facts was 
part of the process through which the jury would guide judicial 
discretion in sentencing.248 So the Court felt justified in relying 
on its belief that, given proper instructions, juries are capable of 
making tough decisions.249 
According to the Proffitt Court, arbitrariness would be elimi-
nated where “the sentencing authority’s discretion is guided and 
channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that argue 
in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty . . . .”250 So 
even though judges were, in the view of the Proffitt Court, better 
at consistently applying the death penalty, juries would still serve 
to channel judicial discretion.251 
But Hurst changes the entire calculus of Proffitt. In Hurst, the 
Court considered the same death penalty sentencing scheme that 
was considered in Proffitt. Proffitt held the scheme constitutional 
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“on its face”252 because judges are more consistent than juries in 
finding and weighing sentencing facts.253 Hurst, however, found the 
same scheme to be facially unconstitutional because the “Sixth 
Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact neces-
sary to impose a sentence of death.”254 The Court flatly concluded, 
“[a] jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.”255 
While Hurst was decided on Sixth Amendment grounds, its 
holding implicates Eighth Amendment deficiencies in Florida’s 
death penalty scheme. Proffitt relied, at least in part, on the jury 
fact-findings to channel and guide the discretion of sentencing 
judges, even though the jury would make no actual findings of fact 
on the record that would go to support the sentence.256 By holding 
that only the jury can make findings necessary to impose death, 
Hurst declared that Florida juries were not making constitutionally 
mandated findings of fact in death penalty cases.257 Since the criti-
cal factual findings have not been made, Florida juries have never 
appropriately channeled or guided the sentencing authority as de-
scribed in Proffitt.258 
By holding that jury-found facts, rather than judge-found facts, 
must anchor Florida death sentences, Hurst eroded one of Proffitt’s 
main pillars.259 The Proffitt Court considered jury fact-finding to 
serve as a check on the sentencing court by way of the jury’s sen-
tencing recommendation.260 But Hurst makes clear that no such 
check was in place.261 The jury fact-finding never made its way 
to the judge, the ultimate sentencer. So, in the forty years after 
Proffitt, people have been sentenced to death and executed in Flor-
ida without jury findings, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and 
concomitantly without jury channeling judicial sentencing discre-
                                                                                                             
 252 Id. at 253. 
 253 Id. at 252. 
 254 Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016). 
 255 Id. 
 256 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252. 
 257 Hurst, slip op. at 1. 
 258 See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258. 
 259 Hurst, slip op. at 1. 
 260 See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252. 
 261 Hurst, slip op. at 1. 
2016] HURST V. FLORIDA'S HA'P'ORTH OF TAR 1169 
tion, in violation of the Eighth. In other words, Florida death sen-
tences for the last forty years have been—contrary to the holding 
in Proffitt—unconstitutionally arbitrary.262 
And the problem was not entirely unknown. Florida Supreme 
Court Justice Pariente, in her dissent from the affirmance of Timo-
thy Hurst’s death sentence in 2014, acknowledged Eighth Amend-
ment problems263 that went unresolved later by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Hurst. The Hurst Court specifically mentioned Justice 
Pariente’s dissent, noting that “[s]he reiterated her view that ‘Ring 
requires any fact that qualifies a capital defendant for a sentence 
of death to be found by a jury.’”264 But Justice Pareinte’s dissent 
went further than the implications of Ring; it addressed Eighth 
Amendment concerns with Florida’s death penalty that the Hurst 
Court declined to address: 
Finally, I also take this opportunity to note an evolv-
ing concern as to the possible Eighth Amendment 
implications of Florida’s outlier status, among those 
decreasing number of states that still retain the death 
penalty, on the issue of jury unanimity in death pen-
alty cases. Except for Florida, every state that im-
poses the death penalty, as well as the federal system, 
requires a unanimous jury verdict as to the finding 
of an aggravating circumstance. This means that in 
no other state or federal court in the country would 
Hurst have been sentenced to death in this case in the 
absence of a unanimous jury finding of an aggravat-
ing circumstance. Florida is a clear outlier.265 
With jury fact-finding that treats aggravators as elements of the 
crime of capital murder comes the requirement of unanimity266. And 
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with unanimity comes fewer death sentences and narrowing of cap-
ital murder cases down to the worst of the worst.267 Thus, a lack of 
jury fact-finding violates not  only the right to a jury trial, but  
a l so  the right to a non-arbitrary capital sentencing by unconstitu-
tionally expanding the class of defendants subject to the death pen-
alty. 
Beyond jury fact-finding, the Proffit Court relied heavily on the 
Florida Supreme Court’s review process to check the sentencing 
judge’s discretion.268 The Court noted—perhaps overenthusiasti-
cally—that “[t]he statute provides for automatic review by the Su-
preme Court of Florida” and thus “Florida capital-sentencing proce-
dures [] seek to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed 
in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”269 The Proffitt Court even 
took a moment to fawn over the Florida Supreme Court for “un-
dertak[ing] responsibly to perform its function of death sentence 
review with a maximum of rationality and consistency.”270 
And so, after the Proffitt Court concluded that trial judges are 
the most consistent in death sentencing, the Court placed the re-
mainder of its faith in the justices of the Florida Supreme 
Court.271 Any risk of a trial judge sentencing in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner, in the Proffitt Court’s opinion, was “minimized 
by Florida’s appellate review system, under which the evidence of 
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is reviewed and 
reweighed by the Supreme Court of Florida ‘to determine inde-
pendently whether the imposition of the ultimate penalty is war-
ranted.’”272 The Proffitt Court heralded the Florida Supreme 
Court’s vacating of eight out of twenty-one death sentences it had 
reviewed at the time Proffitt was decided,273 which the Proffitt 
Court took to mean that the Florida Supreme Court was ensuring 
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that each sentence was “consistent with other sentences imposed in 
similar circumstances.”274 
However, the Proffitt Court’s great reliance on Florida Supreme 
Court review was premised on the assumption that the review was 
based on proper fact-findings: 
Since . . . the trial judge must justify the imposi-
tion of a death sentence with written findings, mean-
ingful appellate review of each such sentence is 
made possible, and the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida . . . considers its function to be to “[guarantee] 
that the [aggravating and mitigating] reasons present 
in one case will reach a similar result to that reached 
under similar circumstances in another case . . . . If a 
defendant is sentenced to die, this Court can review 
that case in light of the other decisions and determine 
whether or not the punishment is too great.” State 
v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 10 (1973).275 
The review was only made meaningful by the presence of 
written fact-findings. This is critical because the jury’s fact-find-
ings were not of record; only the trial court’s sentencing order de-
scribing the judge’s fact-findings was the basis of review. Because 
Hurst recognized that the Sixth Amendment made jury fact-find-
ings the only findings upon which death may be imposed, Florida 
Supreme Court review of Florida death sentences can only be 
proper and meaningful under the Eighth Amendment if it is based 
on those jury findings.276 Thus, Hurst revealed that, along with 
constitutionally defective trial-level sentencing determinations, 
there have been forty years of meaningless and inadequate appel-
late review in the Florida Supreme Court.277 None of those vol-
umes and volumes worth of proportionality analysis from the Flor-
ida Supreme Court— no matter how earnest—could satisfy the 
Eighth Amendment. 
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Beyond the lack of jury fact-findings and meaningful appellate 
review, in the years since Proffitt, the channeling of judicial dis-
cretion achieved by the statutory enumeration of a finite number 
of aggravating circumstances has diminished. There must be clear 
and objective standards to sufficiently guide and narrow sentencing 
discretion.278 However, it has been Florida’s practice over the dec-
ades following Proffitt to expand, rather than reduce, the factors 
that make the death penalty applicable.279 At the time of Proffitt, 
there were a total of eight aggravating circumstances, a fact 
which the Proffitt Court cited approvingly: “[t]he sentencing au-
thority in Florida, the trial judge, is directed to weigh eight aggra-
vating factors against seven mitigating factors to determine whether 
the death penalty shall be imposed.”280 The Court quoted at length 
the statutory description for each aggravator.281 In the years after 
Proffitt, Florida doubled the list to sixteen.282 
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Thus, for years there has been double the potential findings 
that can place a particular murder into that narrow category of the 
“worst of the worst” for which death is an appropriate punish-
ment.283 By doubling the amount of aggravating factors since Prof-
fitt, Florida has ensured that seemingly all manner of homicides will 
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be death-eligible. The reader might peruse the list of sixteen and ask 
herself what homicide would not include at least one of those char-
acteristics. 
Thus, when it came to finding aggravators in Florida, the nar-
rowing, the channeling, a n d  the jury involvement were added at 
the step where a jury found sufficient aggravators. That was the 
moment of narrowing. That was the line that only the worst of the 
worst murders were supposed to cross. But, according to Hurst, 
that line was never drawn pursuant to the actual, operative find-
ings of aggravating circumstances that went to support death sen-
tences. Worse yet, for decades there has been no jury-ensured, ap-
pellate-ensured consistency in Florida death sentencing. 
The only consistency in Florida death sentencing since Furman 
has been the consistently expanding universe of defendants eligible 
to be executed under an unconstitutional scheme. 
In reassessing the Eighth Amendment compliance of death 
sentences imposed under Florida’s post-Furman death penalty 
scheme, it must be considered that the narrowing accomplished by 
having a limited list of aggravating factors has broken down along 
with that accomplished by jury fact-finding and appellate review. 
Each of the three key checks of judicial discretion relied on by the 
Proffitt Court have either been proven meaningless or greatly di-
minished. As a result, there is nothing left of Proffitt. 
For forty years, Florida’s death penalty has sailed smoothly 
enough under Proffitt’s ensign, with trial judges as the captain. 
But Hurst is a sea o f  change. Proffitt’s reliance on jury fact-
finding and appellate review to narrow the discretion of sentenc-
ing judges was misplaced. Justice Pariente was correct that 
. . . in no other state or federal court in the country 
would Hurst have been sentenced to death in this 
case in the absence of a unanimous jury finding of 
an aggravating circumstance. Florida is a clear out-
lier. . . . 
While questions of public policy regarding Florida’s 
capital sentencing statute are left to the Legislature, 
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the Sixth and Eighth Amendment implications of 
Florida’s outlier status on the lack of jury unanimity, 
which threaten to unravel our entire death penalty 
scheme, should be of serious concern.284 
Expanding on Justice Pariente’s dissent, it can be said that in no 
other state or federal court in the country would the 389 people on 
Florida’s death row285 have been sentenced to death on non-
binding, bare majority, undisclosed fact-findings. And that makes 
Florida’s post-Furman, pre- Hurst death penalty scheme look very 
much like a deliberate widening of death eligibility, rather than the 
constitutionally required narrowing.286 
It may prove to be that the Eighth Amendment problem in Flor-
ida’s death penalty scheme went beyond the lack of jury fact-find-
ings in sentencing and also had to do with a lack of jury sentenc-
ing. When the Hurst Court overruled Spaziano as inconsistent 
with its holding that “a jury, not a judge, [must] find each fact 
necessary to impose a sentence of death,”287 it indirectly found jury 
sentencing to be constitutionally required in Florida. This is due 
to the fact that the Florida Legislature, in drafting Florida’s former 
death penalty statute, wrote the Sixth Amendment finding of ag-
gravators and the Eighth Amendment weighing of sentencing fac-
tors into a single, indivisible step.288 Under the statute, the fact-find-
ing necessary to impose death was the sentencing calculus. Hurst 
identified the requisite findings of sufficient aggravators not out-
weighed by mitigators—which is the sentencing determination—as 
the operative Sixth Amendment fact-finding. In other words, the 
Sixth Amendment requirement that juries must do the operative 
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fact-finding ends up having the effect that juries must do the sen-
tencing. Thus, the Florida Legislature unintentionally merged two 
bodies of constitutional law, by contravening both. 
Hurst overruled Spaziano’s upholding of Florida’s sentencing 
scheme under the Eighth Amendment.289 In Spaziano, the Supreme 
Court noted that in the years after Furman it had “emphasized its 
pursuit of the ‘twin objectives’ of ‘measured, consistent application 
and fairness to the accused.’”290 The Court went on to confidently 
state, “nothing in those twin objectives suggests that the sentence 
must or should be imposed by a jury.”291 But now that there is 
a requirement in Hurst that the death determination be made by a 
jury, the entire underpinnings of a jury’s constitutional role in the 
“twin objectives” must be reconsidered from an Eighth Amend-
ment perspective.292 “Time and subsequent cases have washed away 
the logic”293 of Spaziano’s preferential view of judicial sagacity 
over the judgment of the common man affirming the conscience of 
the larger society.294 
The manner in which time washed away the logic of prior prec-
edent is reflected in Justice Breyer’s evolution on the issue of 
whether the Eighth Amendment requires a jury determination of the 
death penalty. In his concurrence in Ring, he stated “[a]lthough I 
joined the majority in Harris v. Alabama, I have come to agree 
with the dissenting view”295 and declared “I therefore conclude 
that the Eighth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, 
make the decision to sentence a defendant to death.”296 Justice 
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Breyer’s position on this may yet prove to be prescient. Where Prof-
fitt celebrated the trial judge’s experiential helmsmanship in sen-
tencing, Hurst hoists the jury’s expression of social conscience 
prominently to the masthead.297 Rather than falling prey to what 
Emerson termed the “hobgoblin” of “foolish consistency,”298 Flor-
ida’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence regarding a jury’s role in 
death penalty sentencing would do well to move forward along the 
Sixth Amendment course charted by Apprendi, Ring, and Hurst. 
Justice Breyer is not alone. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority 
opinion in Spaziano that the Court would overrule in Hurst.299 
Ten years after he wrote for the Spaziano majority to uphold 
Florida’s death penalty scheme, he defied Emerson’s hobgoblin, and 
changed course: 
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with 
the machinery of death. For more than 20 years I 
have endeavored—indeed, I have struggled—along 
with a majority of this Court, to develop procedural 
and substantive rules that would lend more than the 
mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty en-
deavor. Rather than continue to coddle the Court’s 
delusion that the desired level of fairness has been 
achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I 
feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to 
concede that the death penalty experiment has 
failed.300 
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The logic supporting Proffitt and the Eighth Amendment en-
dorsement of judge-based sentencing in the context of Florida’s 
former death penalty scheme is being washed out in the same tide 
that carried Spaziano and Hildwin. 
Four decades of hindsight after Proffitt has not borne any cre-
dence to the Supreme Court’s faith of Florida’s death penalty 
scheme. While Florida executed ninety-one people since 1979, 
twenty-six death-sentenced people were exonerated.301 Thus, for 
every 3.5 executions, Florida came within a hair’s breadth of ex-
ecuting a person wrongly convicted.302 This, along with Hurst, 
indicates that Proffitt has broken free from its frayed moorings 
and should be cast away from its berth in the Eighth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
What we have written here certainly does not exhaust Hurst’s 
Eighth Amendment consequences. As if from a crack in the hull of 
a ship, Hurst’s implications spider-web outward, reaching far and 
undermining the integrity of Florida’s Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence in ways yet to be seen. We have chosen here to chase down 
a few of the more troubling fracture lines. We have suggested that 
they could be repaired for a mere ha’p’orth of tar, compared to the 
cost of waiting. Perhaps the courts will do so. But not until the hull 
is fully restored will Florida’s death penalty again be seaworthy. 
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